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This project examines how English football evolved from a culture of 
hooliganism and poor upkeep into a popular and enterprising industry across the globe. 
The Premier League and its stars marketed the English game and its culture worldwide. 
Since the 1990s England has established itself as the leading club footballing nation. I 
argue that through football, and the culture and economics behind it, we can see the ways 
in which England attempted to change its image in the modern world. In the 1980s and 
1990s Britain was confronted with its own established culture of violence, bigotry, and 
nationalist pride, particularly the sport of football. English football clubs and the English 
Football Association (FA) adapted in an effort to change their image and create a more 
accessible and marketable product. This study examines those changes and the ways in 
which they impacted the league, clubs, and fan culture in footballing communities. With 
a limited and economics-focused historiography on the subject, this work will contribute 
to the discussion by exploring a cultural perspective and examining the changes and 
economic impact from club and fan levels. It will also place this evolution within a 
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION 
 
On May 13, 2012, the final day of the 2011/12 Premier League season, 
Manchester United and Manchester City went into their final respective games level on 
points at the top of the league table. Manchester City were battling their local rivals for 
the league title for the first time since 1968, and both Manchester clubs left their London 
rivals Arsenal, Tottenham Hotspurs, and Chelsea well in the dust, the closest of them 
finishing nineteen points behind. Though the matches started at the same time, 
Manchester United’s 1-0 victory over Sunderland finished a few minutes ahead of their 
cross-town rivals, who at the time were down 1-2 to Queen’s Park Rangers with five 
minutes of stoppage time to play. If the results held, United would be champions, but if 
City could mount a late comeback and win, their goal difference would give them the 
edge in the final league table. The Citizens had struggled to build themselves up to the 
level of their much more successful neighbors, but  after a financial takeover in 2008 they 
began spending like champions on marquee players to put themselves on the cusp of 
history.  
In the first minute of stoppage time, Bosnian striker Edin Dzeko scored an 
equalizer for City. Immediately the mood shifted in the stadium, and suddenly City’s 
dominance late in the game felt vindicated as their efforts materialized on the scoreboard. 
The season was not yet lost. QPR were well in their own goal area defending, and looked 
like it was only a matter of time before they conceded. Right on cue, with seconds 
remaining, Mario Balotelli exchanged passes with Sergio Aguero, who then darted into 
the area and smashed the ball past QPR’s helpless goalkeeper, winning Manchester City 
 
2 
their first league title in forty-four years. It was a league title four years and over £1 
billion in the making for City’s new owners, and they were just getting started.1  
Just moments after United’s match ended they believed they were champions, and 
now the giants of the English game were left speechless, forced to witness the beginning 
of the end of their dynasty via mobile phone updates. “I swear you’ll never see anything 
like this ever again!,” cried match commentator Martin Tyler, who’d been working match 
coverage for nearly as many years. “So watch it, drink it in... Two goals in added time for 
Manchester City to snatch the title away from Manchester United!”2 Over on another 
channel, commentator Peter Drury voiced similar amazement. “He’s won the league with 
90 seconds of stoppage time to play! Where does football go from here?”3 The Premier 
League, now broadcast globally, marketed as “The Greatest Show on Earth,” had 
delivered.  
The sports world was gasping for breath in its reaction, and even in the United 
States, where soccer fever has taken its time to develop, the event was a hot topic. For 
late night host Seth Meyers the game was reminiscent of the Boston Red Sox defeating 
the New York Yankees and breaking the curse of the Bambino.4 City played the role of 
plucky underdogs who finally turned it around to beat their dynastic rivals. It was truly a 
 
1 David Goldblatt, The Game of our Lives: The English Premier League and the Making of 
Modern Britain. (New York, NY: Nation Books, 2014), 173-174.  
2 Martin Tyler, “Manchester City vs. Queens Park Rangers.” Sky Sports, Manchester, England: 
BSkyB, May 13, 2012.   
3 Peter Drury, “Manchester City vs. Queens Park Rangers.” ITV, Manchester, England: ITV, May 
13, 2012. 




remarkable turnaround for City, who only a decade earlier were fighting for promotion to 
the Premier League. But were City truly underdogs?  
The 2008 takeover of Manchester City by Sheikh Mansour and the Abu Dhabi 
United Group for Development and Investment introduced state wealth investment, 
forever changing the fortunes of the club and football.5 Within two seasons they were 
attracting top up-and-coming talents in the transfer market, offering high wages to 
compete with traditionally successful clubs such as Manchester United and Arsenal. By 
2012 Manchester City had won the FA Cup and Premier League respectively in 
successive seasons, cementing themselves as a competitor in English Football.6 The 
power of investment was undeniably the driving force behind City’s arrival as a Premier 
League power, and was indicative of how the sport had evolved in recent years. Soon 
after City’s Emirati takeover, members of the Qatari royal family purchased French club 
Paris Saint-Germain. In 2003 Russian Oligarch and Vladimir Putin ally Roman 
Abramovich successfully purchased Chelsea Football Club. An age of new money had 
well and truly begun, and was turning up results for the clubs in question. Significantly, 
many of the Premier League’s newest investors were not British, indicating the new wide 
reach of English football. Football attracted money for a multitude of reasons, and the 
Premier League was at the forefront of a movement that made revenue focused 
management the standard in football. It set the standard for lucrative television deals, 
attracted the biggest stars in the game with high wages, and sent multiple star-studded 
teams into Europe’s premier tournament, the UEFA Champions League. 
 
5 “Manchester City: Timeline of a transformation since 2008 Sheikh Mansour takeover.” BBC, 
August 31, 2018. 
6 Goldblatt, The Game of our Lives, 175.  
 
4 
Any Manchester United loss was rare enough in the Premier League era, but 
getting outdone by their local rival was a very new experience for the Red Devil faithful. 
Manchester United won thirteen Premier League titles in the twenty seasons after the 
inception of the Premier League in the spring of 1992. Manager Sir Alex Ferguson took 
charge in 1986 and rarely looked back over his twenty-six year career with the club, 
returning the club to familiar heights as one of the best football sides in the world. Not 
only this, the era of dominance that Ferguson oversaw made Manchester United the most 
valuable sports franchise in the world in 2012, valued at nearly $2.235 billion by Forbes.7  
Only three clubs in England truly challenged Ferguson’s sporting genius and 
powerhouse club. The first, Arsenal, was another traditional power of the game which 
grew into the Premier League era with grace and style. Their bold decision to bring in 
French manager Arsene Wenger in 1996 led to a cultural and tactical evolution of the 
club, and their success reinforced the arrival of foreign players, managers, and styles to 
the English game. The other two clubs to challenge Ferguson’s United teams were the 
aforementioned Manchester City and Chelsea respectively. Both were historically mid-
tier clubs whose fortunes were changed by an enormous injection of money from new, 
rich owners.8 For Chelsea it was Russian billionaire Roman Abramovich, an oil and 
television mogul who aided tremendously in Vladimir Putin’s arrival in Russian politics. 
For Manchester City it was Sheikh Mansour, a member of the royal family of Abu Dhabi 
and Deputy Prime Minister of the United Arab Emirates. Each spent heavily on transfers 
with the intent to build title winning sides as soon as possible. The fortunes of both clubs 
 
7 “Manchester United still the world's richest football club.” BBC News, April 19, 2012, 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/17769654 (November 17, 2020) 
8 Goldblatt, The Game of our Lives, 85.  
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were changed overnight by these owners, and they were not alone. Premier League 
football attracted a lot of foreign investment, and the reason why was the level of 
popularity, profit, and opportunity that it offered its clubs was a level unmatched in any 
other league.  
Money became the primary driver of modern professional sports in the late 
twentieth century, and football was no exception. However, unlike American professional 
sports, money was not regulated the same way in England, and before the 1990s 
expanding profit was not a driving motivation for most teams. The sport was by no means 
young, but the culture of it was not at the exposure level that it has since developed. 
Football clubs did what they needed to stay afloat financially, remaining competitive as 
best they could within those parameters. Most clubs were majority fan owned, with 
perhaps one to a few wealthy businessmen acting as major financial backers. In order to 
maintain the stadium experience and match-day revenue, very few games were televised 
for much of the 20th century.9 However, the upkeep of English football by the 1980s 
demonstrated to club owners and executives that old methods of club management were 
unsustainable. Even the best clubs had trouble maintaining stadiums and quelling fan 
violence, and English football’s reputation soured quickly in the mid-1980s. A violent 
incident started by Liverpool fans at the 1985 European Cup final at Heysel stadium in 
Brussels, Belgium led to the ban of all English clubs from participating in European 
competitions for at least six seasons.10 In a human stampede thirty-nine people were 
 
9 Jonathan Clegg and Joshua Robinson, The Club: How the English Premier League Became the 
Wildest, Richest, Most Disruptive Force in Sports, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing, 
2018), 59-60. 
10 “English Clubs Bid To Lift Bans,” Aberdeen Press and Journal, June 26, 1985.  
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killed, and hundreds more were left injured. The European Cup, rebranded as the UEFA 
Champions League in 1992, was the most sought after prize in club football, and a 
competition English clubs had done quite well in for previous decades. Manchester 
United were the first English side to lift the cup in 1968, and from the years 1977-1984 
English clubs Liverpool (four times), Nottingham Forest (two times), and Aston Villa 
(once) won the competition a combined seven times. Despite a historically poor period 
for the English national team at that time, the clubs were taking over the world nearly 
every year.11 The ban by UEFA ended that reign, and by the time English clubs re-
entered the competition they were undergoing seismic structural and cultural changes.  
The foundation of the English Premier League was a pivotal moment in the sport. 
The owners and chairmen of the most successful clubs in the country decided to take it 
upon themselves to reform the top flight of the English league system, and through the 
financial backing of satellite television, an alliance with the BBC, and approval from the 
English FA and players union they successfully broke away from the English Football 
League in 1992. They created a league that was designed for profit, expansion of 
television revenue, and importantly club governance. Inspired by the National Football 
League in the United States, the Premier League based its governance and business 
model on the ideals of profitability and club control without many barriers of 
accountability. The sport was forever changed in England, and though the football 
product increased in quality, a number of issues within the game and its communites 
became exposed by the spotlight.  
 
11 “UEFA Champions League: Champions League Winners,” TransferMarkt, 
https://www.transfermarkt.com/uefa-champions-league/erfolge/pokalwettbewerb/CL (November 19, 2020) 
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Football became one of England’s most celebrated national pastimes. England 
was the birthplace of organized structure in the sport, and became the precedent for the 
growth of the game in the nineteenth century to what it became as a global phenomenon. 
The pride associated with this was complicated but undying, and the importance of the 
Premier League in English culture was reflective of that. The Premier League was the 
catalyst for English football’s revival at the club level after the dark decade of the 1980s, 
and brought an unprecedented level of talent to England’s shores. The economics behind 
the league were crucial, but posed a danger of leaving behind what made the sport 
special. At the heart of this topic is a power struggle between these communities and the 
club owners that took control of their clubs. Football supporters and the communities 
behind players, clubs, and national teams generated a passion that fueled the game to 
global conquest, and though globalization came with further complications it remained 
impossible for the consumer to be ignored. Despite this, power undeniably shifted away 
from the community and toward the wealthy individual owners of clubs, many of whom 
were increasingly disconnected from the communities of their clubs. The football 
communities are an undeniably important part of England, let alone English football, and 
all of the baggage that came with that societal connection was inherently intertwined with 
the sport. Their significance within the game could not be forgotten, but whether or not 
they had agency within their club became an important factor in their conditional support.  
In this thesis I will argue that through commercialization and the formation of the 
Premier League, English football transformed economically and culturally in 
unprecedented ways. Clubs attracted the best talent in football with higher wages and 
elite managers, and played attractive hybrid football that blended English styles with 
 
8 
other philosophies, concepts, tactics from around the world. The embarrassment of 
Heysel paired with the tragedy of the Hillsborough Disaster in 1989 created a moment of 
opportunity in English football, which England’s biggest clubs took by agreeing to break 
away from the Football League and form the new Premier league in 1992. The result was 
a monumental, and especially profitable sporting venture that gave English clubs 
unprecedented financial power through the introduction of television revenue. 
Commercialization led revenue focused club and league management to become the 
norm in the game of football, and this thesis will examine the ways in which the English 
game was impacted by this shift. In addition to the economic effects of the Premier 
League, I will study the ways in which the culture, management, and the football itself 
were impacted at fan and club levels. Significantly the conditions of commercialization 
and the expenses associated with it gave greater value to making football accessible. 
Racism and fan violence had to be addressed for the sake of social and financial safety, 
which brought England’s long history of racism and xenophobia to the surface of 
governance in the sport. The expense of club management in this era also led clubs to 
turn to wealthy individuals and investment groups, which in turn established greater 
control over clubs independent from the input of supporters. These changes underlined 
the significant reach of football culture in England, and how it reflected English society 
as a whole.  
Literature Review  
English and European football has been a source of interest to economists, 
sociologists, and historians. One of the most important football historians to this thesis is 
Jonathan Wilson. Though Wilson is not a professional academic, he is well respected as a 
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historian of football, and has made major contributions to English football historiography 
in recent years, particularly in his ability to tie culture to the game itself. His most 
popular work Inverting the Pyramid is a thorough history of football tactics and the ways 
in which philosophies of the game spread across the world, taking on new and unique 
identities within specific cultural groups, nations, and clubs. This book provides thorough 
historical context to the development of the modern European game, and the multiple 
pan-European methods that have made their way into the English game.12 Though the 
book was not as relevant to my study of English football as it would be to a wider study, 
it was helpful in providing frameworks for viewing the interaction of cultures and ideas 
across borders.  
Wilson’s Anatomy of Manchester United book was useful to this thesis as well. 
The book is disjointed in terms of historical focus, choosing to address certain periods of 
club history by focusing on specific matches and the context surrounding them. However, 
it offers relevant content through its focus on club issues in the 1980s, 1990s, and twenty-
first century, and its creative writing style and use of sources.13 The book provides 
primary sources for chapter four on Manchester United, and offers insight on the club’s 
commercial and cultural transformation in the 1990s and 2000s and the most recent 
developments since the Glazer family takeover of the club. Though their tenure was 
anything but easy-going, football writers were quick to point out the stability and laid 
back approach provided by the Glazer leadership. This massively underestimated the 
 
12 Wilson, Jonathan. Inverting the Pyramid: The History of Football Tactics, (Orion Publishing 
Group: London, Limited), 2018. 
13 Jonathan Wilson, The Anatomy of Manchester United: A History in Ten Matches, (Orion 
Publishing Group: London, 2017),  
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inconsistency that followed on the pitch as well as the inadequate performance of their 
Chief Executive Ed Woodward drew a lot of criticism.14  
Another important work of Wilson’s to this project is The Barcelona Inheritance, 
a book which frames FC Barcelona’s modern history as an almost familial history. 
Wilson argues that though the club has had many separate periods of success, it is unique 
for its devotion to a tradition and philosophy that has become almost synonymous with 
the club itself and Catalan culture. Tactically managers have changed a bit, but there is 
always a focus on the system installed by Johann Cruyff. Cruyff was a star player of AFC 
Ajax in Amsterdam and the Dutch national team in the 1960s and 1970s before moving 
to Barcelona as a player in 1973.15 He left in 1978, but returned in 1988 as a manager, 
and installed his Dutch tiki-taka system. In addition to his tactical prowess, Cruyff 
focused on building up La Masia, Barcelona’s youth academy, by identifying and 
developing talent early. This academy produced many successful players, including Xavi 
Hernandez, Andres Iniesta, and Lionel Messi, the latter of whom is regarded as one of the 
greatest players of all time.16 This modern history is not unlike that of English club 
Manchester United, whose greatest period of success has also happened from the 1990s 
to the early 2010s, and whose club structure and culture value philosophy, tradition, and 
style. Both commercialization and success have complicated these values, something 
 
14 Simon Edmonds, “Manchester United: Arguments For and Against the Glazers,” Bleacher 
Report, September 6, 2012. https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1324651-manchester-united-arguments-for-
and-against-the-glazers-at-man-utd (September 1, 2020) 
15 Jonathan Wilson, The Barcelona Inheritance: The Evolution of Winning Soccer Tactics from 
Cruyff to Guardiola, (PublicAffairs: New York, 2018), 22-23. 
16 Wilson, The Barcelona Inheritance. 58. 
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which Wilson’s perspective covers well, having witnessed much of the game’s modern 
developments in his career as a journalist.17  
Wilson's club case study in The Barcelona Inheritance is a useful study of a 
specific club and its fan culture over an extended period in the modern era of the sport. 
Manchester United is similar to Barcelona in terms of history, success, and following, 
and established a particular significance to the English game as well as world football. 
My work is similar to Wilson’s in that I try to approach this history of the Premier 
League with an understanding of the culture of the game in mind. The significance of 
football did not rest solely in its economic value, even as commercialization drastically 
increased the economy of the sport. The sport existed for over one hundred years in 
England before television money injected a fortune of cash into the game, and though 
money became a necessity the clubs and players still rely on supporters and football 
communities for patronage and sustainability.  
The undeniable influence of money in the Premier League era made economics a 
necessary area of scholarship to incorporate into this project, and there was significant 
work done by economists in the area which guided my research. Economist Stefan 
Szymanksi took specific focus on the growth of commercialization and investment in the 
sport over the past few decades. The influence of television money behind this shift 
towards commercially driven management and the competitive ramifications of the 
money-driven game are both compelling narratives in this thesis as well. Szymanski 
identified a social hierarchy in the game, which was not absent from the discourse before 
 
17 Wilson, The Anatomy of Manchester United, xiii. 
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the era of big-money, but was dramatically flipped on its head in the 1990s and 2000s. 
Largely unrestricted investment into clubs allowed both the consolidation of power by 
certain traditionally successful clubs and the rise of new powerhouses funded by oligarch 
billionaires and, in some cases, state investment groups representing royal families. 
Books like Money and Soccer and Soccernomics demonstrate Szymanski’s work on the 
role of finances in modern football in general, and were hugely influential to this thesis.  
Jonathan Clegg and Joshua Robinson’s The Club was another major contributor to 
the history of the Premier League from an economic perspective. The book offered a 
narrative of the financial developments in English football, unpacking the history behind 
the dramatic structural transformations that took place in the early 1990s, the conditions 
and tragedies in English football that led to such transformations, and the impact of 
foreign and domestic investment into the English top flight. The scholarship on this 
subject emphasized Heysel and Hillsborough as primary influences of change in England, 
which led to the formation of the Premier League. Clegg and Robinson in particular gave 
significance to this period of change as a tremendous economic opportunity for the top 
English clubs, which they showed were looking for avenues of modernization and 
revenue growth for some time.18 Their work is an excellent blueprint for studying the 
Premier League, but is heavily economics focused. They emphasized the influence of 
figures like Rupert Murdoch, one of many financial moguls to profit from the easing of 
government restrictions under Margaret Thatcher, was identified for his role, with his 
company BSkyB, in deciding to gamble on television rights to the young but promising 
 
18 Clegg and Robinson, The Club, 74. 
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Premier League.19 The revision of the English top flight from the First Division to the 
Premier League was conceived by the executives of the most historically successful clubs 
in England, but led by Manchester United and Arsenal Executives, Martin Edwards and 
David Dein respectively.20 The Club also demonstrated the dramatic way in which money 
impacted football discourse. This aspect of the game is crucial to its modern 
developments, and I argue it is the turn that made the Premier League such an attractive 
product to domestic and foreign managers, players, audiences, and financiers. The 
Premier League drew some of the largest worldwide television audiences in the history of 
sport, and its profit-driven approach from day 1 helped to expand its audience, attract the 
best talents with higher wages than almost all continental leagues, and drive foreign 
investment in its clubs by billionaires from all over the globe.21 Clegg and Robinson, both 
regular contributors to The Wall Street Journal, have a clear background in economics, 
and an even clearer interest in the economics of the sport rather than the culture. Though 
this thesis focuses heavily on cultural developments in the history of the Premier League, 
the economic perspective and analysis of economic scholars are necessary to this project 
for their telling of the history and translation of economic discourse.   
Football’s profitability was a driving motivation behind a number of changes to 
the league, partially spearheaded by club officials and owners, and was successful in 
changing fortunes in English Football both financially and competitively. However, there 
is not necessarily a direct correlation between profitability and success, something that 
 
19 Clegg and Robinson, The Club, 31. 
20 Clegg and Robinson, The Club, 74-75. 
21 Clegg and Robinson, The Club, 236. 
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became far more noticeable as the commercialization of the game continued, nor was 
there any longer a distinction between the two, as was believed to be the case for years 
before the creation of the Premier League.22 
 The issue of racism in football is particularly important to the arguments of this 
thesis as well. Racism in English football was significant not only for its effect on fan 
culture, but for the relationship between fans and players as football became an area of 
society in which racism was actively combated. As questions of football governance 
came into the spotlight, so too did the issue of racism, efforts to fight racism, and the 
ways in which agents of the game participated in those efforts. Football was a cultural 
arena in which England was firmly in the spotlight because of the international reach of 
the Premier League and the diverse star personalities that it attracts from around the 
world. Scholars like Emy Onuora and Brett Bebber showed how in the closing decades of 
the twentieth century England was confronted with its own culture of violence, bigotry, 
and nationalism in society and the sport of football, and that football culture became a 
vessel for anti-racist activism.23 Significantly the works of both of these scholars leads 
directly into the Premier League era in question in this thesis.24 The government, the FA, 
the clubs, and even the players themselves acted against racism to varying degrees of 
success in order to change the image and create a more accessible footballing product.  
Works such as Laurent Dubois’ Soccer Empire and The Changing Face of 
Football by Les Back, Tim Crabbe, and John Solomos also gave greater context to a 
 
22 Stefan Szymanski, “Why is Manchester United so Successful?” Business Strategy Review. 47.  
23 Onuora, Emy, Pitch Black, (London: Biteback Publishing Ltd, 2015), 23.  




complex history of racism,postcolonialism, and national identity in European football. 
Dubois, a historian of the French Empire, contributed to the historical scholarship in 
modern football by analyzing the strong, and often tense relationship between the French 
national team stars and French nationalism in politics and the press.25 As the French team 
began to more and more visibly resemble the diversity of France, so too did it endure the 
unwanted attention of the National Front and racism and islamophobia. This work offers 
an important parallel to my own study of the way black and foreign players dealt with 
abuse and criticism in England, as well as using the English press as a source for 
measuring public discourse. Dubois studied players whose experiences were unique to 
France and the French public, but his discussion of the sport in regards to the legacy of 
imperialism and the ties between the sport and political activism are both relevant in 
England as well.  
Back, Crabbe, and Solomos similarly addressed issues of national identity, race, 
and football culture, but this sociological work examines cases within the English game.26 
Sources included fan articles, newspaper coverage, club songs, and official policy on 
racism and hate speech at football grounds.27 Football was almost exclusively a white-
male dominated spectacle in Britain for much of the 20th century, and as the sport 
evolved attempts were made to make the environment safer for other demographics and 
families. The issues of identity and expression within public rituals is crucial to the 
cultural aspect of this project, and this book and other sociological studies are a useful 
 
25 Laurent Dubois, Soccer Empire: The World Cup and the Future of France, (Oakland, CA: 
University of California Press, 2010), 14.  
26 Les Back, Tim Crabbe, and Jon Solomos, The Changing Face of Football: Racism, Identity, 
and Multiculture in the English Game, (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2001) 
27 Back, Crabbe, and Solomos, The Changing Face of Football, 289. 
 
16 
source of data on the social arena of football. These works include surveys and statistics 
on racism and abuse, as well as accounts of player and fan experiences. For a topic with a 
young historiography, sociological literature was particularly helpful in establishing links 
between the culture of the game and broader social issues.  
Sources 
 The sources utilized in this thesis vary greatly, from government legislation to 
match commentary, but a significant and repeated source was press reports. The common 
saying “journalism is the first rough draft of history” is especially applicable to sport, and 
its meticulous documentation was immensely helpful in the assembly of the history of the 
Premier League and editing of timelines. Crucially, reports also helped to offer insight 
into the sport and major events. This was particularly useful, especially in pieces that 
reflected on events some time after the fact. Some of these reports usefully feature 
supporter-written opinions and blog posts. These primary sources and the secondary 
source literature make up most of the sourcebook for the project.  
In addition to analysis of supporters and the press, there is a specific section of 
source analysis of films produced by or in association with Manchester United. I use 
these films to critically unpack the club’s conscious construction of club identity and 
history. Though the films in question could be used as secondary sources, documentary 
creations after the fact of the history in question, I mostly utilize them as products of the 
extended period of time in question. For example, the Class of 92 documentary film 
produced in 2013, tells the story of Manchester United’s most successful group of 
academy graduates, including star talents Ryan Giggs, Paul Scholes, and David 
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Beckham.28 The film featured a number of key interviews, including former Prime 
Minister Tony Blair, as well as a clear expression of the club values that molded 
Manchester United’s era of success. The presentation of this documentary, I argue, serves 
as a useful source for understanding how the club consciously embraced a certain image 
of its history and culture. The club bought into a positive, almost mythical reputation of 
itself that persisted in that time period, and utilized multiple forms of media to perpetuate 
said reputation as an iconic and constant power in the English game. In addition to 
nation-wide and European-wide dominance, the films demonstrate how significant the 
production of local talent is to the club identity. The films are conscious of a “never say 
die” mentality that became synonymous with the club. It is clear that Manchester United 
view their history of comeback wins in big games, late title races, and dramatic cup runs 
as emblematic of their identity.29 This image was pushed often as well, symbolically 
linking itself to its history as a working class club, and even the club’s recovery after the 
tragic Munich Air Disaster claimed the lives of many club officials and first team players. 
Chapter Structure 
In the first chapter I explore the establishment of the Premier League, the 
economic changes in English league football behind the move, and the revival of English 
clubs as a competitive force in European football as a whole. One of these major 
economic changes was the introduction of television broadcasting. Prior to 1990 it was 
highly irregular for professional football games to be televised live in England. Apart 
from major finals and perhaps the English national team, most audiences were generally 
 
28 Leo Pearlman, “The Class of 92.” DVD. Directed by Ben and Gabe Turner. (London: F73 
Productions, 2013).  
29 Pearlman, “The Class of 92.” 
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limited to one live game, replays, and Match of the Day, an end of the day condensed 
highlights show on the BBC. This system was in place primarily to keep up the match-
day revenue that came with offering an exclusively in-person experience to fans. In 1992 
the clubs in the English First Division left and formed the Premier League, with the 
English FA’s backing, and signed a lucrative TV contract with Rupert Murdoch’s Sky 
Sports channel on BSkyB satellite television, removing English top flight club football 
from terrestrial television.30 The deal was considered by economic historians to have 
been a high risk-reward move that paid off big for BSkyB, and it led to even more 
lucrative television deals domestically and internationally. I show how television revenue 
guaranteed Premier League expansion to overseas markets in the age of burgeoning mass 
communication. This expansion helped to boost popularity of English football, clubs, and 
players and increased club revenue to unprecedented heights.  
The increase in wealth within the game also persuaded more and more wealthy 
individuals to bankroll team expenses as the majority owner, funding higher player 
transfers and wages as the market continued to inflate. However, the increase in the 
Premier League’s wealth also created an immense wealth gap in the English football 
league pyramid, meaning there was more financial risk for clubs that were relegated from 
the Premier League. There was also a more difficult path for promotion to the Premier 
League for clubs in lower divisions. As was the case for Leeds United, the financial stress 
of staying competitive at a Premier League level was too great for some clubs. Entering 
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administration and declaring bankruptcy led to points deductions and penalties for some 
clubs, exacerbating dire situations that sent some clubs to the brink of dissolution.  
Chapter two unpacks the issue of racism and xenophobia in English football, 
which had an ugly reputation for fan violence, hooliganism, and white nationalism in the 
twentieth century. This fostered a sour relationship between fans, players, and authority 
in the game such as the government, the police, and even the clubs themselves. It became 
clear that to reform the sport in Britain there would also need to be a reformation of the 
spectator, something which is expressed by players themselves and members of the press. 
While in the first chapter these reforms were more legal and structural, the second 
chapter explores cultural changes in football communities. Some players took matters 
into their own hands, kicking out against racism and xenophobia in both literal and 
figurative cases, and participating in anti-racism activism and campaigns. The arrival of 
foreign players and managers meant that the English game was more diverse than ever 
before. I argue that these changes were an integral part of English club football’s 
competitive revival in the 1990s and 2000s, and that efforts at social reform to combat 
fan violence and racism were heavily motivated by the need to make the sport more 
accessible to the league’s increasingly diverse players, managers, and audience. Although 
the government enacted policy to combat hooliganism, this chapter shows the influence 
of activism in the sport by anti-racist organizations, supporters, and footballers, as well as 
the effects of multiculturalism and expanded diversity in the Premier League.  
While these efforts and increased regulation of fan culture did quell fan violence, 
and created a more accessible and safe football culture and stadium environment, there 
were also complications with the relationship between fans and authority. With greater 
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investment into teams came the necessity of wealthy backers, and the interest of wealthy 
owners did not often call for greater power to supporters’ trust and minority fan 
ownership. Wealthy owners consolidated their power by conducting forceful buyouts of 
minority shareholders, and the landscape of football communities has been reshaped by 
the necessity of money and investment. The importance of wealth led to a shift from fan-
focused styles of ownership, which created a cultural crisis among fan groups. There 
became a greater concern about the influence that supporters had in the football economy 
as owners acted individually and took power away from fan ownership groups. This 
development played out in various ways that are relevant to the final chapter concerning 
ownership changeover in the Premier League era, and specifically the effects of such 
changeover at the behemoth football club and global brand that is Manchester United 
Football Club. 
The final chapter shifts the focus of the study to the club level, examining the 
effects of commercialization at a top flight English club. It was in fact clubs that led the 
formation of the Premier League, and the richest clubs at that. For this reason I will 
examine the Premier League’s clubs in general, but focus on Manchester United in 
particular. Manchester United were the most successful English top flight team of all 
time, and one of the biggest sports franchises in the world. With an estimated 659 million 
supporters worldwide from a study conducted in 2012, their global appeal paired well 
with their history as a pioneering club in English football before and after the creation of 
the Premier League.31 The most successful era in the club’s history occurred in the 1990s 
 
31 Ed Prior, “Do Manchester United really have 659m supporters?” BBC News, February 18, 
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and 2000s under the leadership of Sir Alex Ferguson. The club built strong teams year 
after year by utilizing their financial power and appeal in the transfer market to attract 
stars from all over the world. Adding to their success and legacy was their world class 
football academy, which developed some of the best youth talent into star professional 
players. Among these talents was David Beckham, a generational English talent who 
became one of the most recognizable celebrities in the world. He was a member of the 
“Class of 92,” which featured 5 other United academy products that helped form the 
backbone of the squad for decades, and played a hybrid style of English football that 
allowed for more individual creative expression that became synonymous with the club 
and culture.32  
As the Premier League marketed itself as the greatest show on earth to a global 
television audience, Manchester United’s sustained success and starpower made them a 
must-watch team. Though clubs like Arsenal and Chelsea achieved periods of success, 
United remained a constant in the English game, winning the league title 13 times in the 
first 20 years of the Premier League. However, after the retirement of Sir Alex Ferguson 
the club’s performances drastically dipped, and the incompetence of the executives in 
team management under the Glazer ownership became much more apparent. For this 
reason the club is an excellent case study with a multi-layered modern history and 
sustained relevance in the age of big money. They were a club with undeniable financial 
and historical credibility, but also a club which was limited in many ways as it attempted 
to form a new identity post-Sir Alex Ferguson. Manchester United became a global entity 
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as well as a football team, and capitalized on its historic success to much economic gain, 
even as performances dipped. This brought positive and negative consequences, as the 
club was able to cement itself at the highest level and maintain its high level of talent, but 
at the same time complicated its cultural fabric and legacy. Fallout of club corporatization 
even alienated some of United’s fans, a section of support which broke away and formed 
a new football club entirely. I explore the impact of commercialization in football culture 
at the fan and player levels, and examine the implications of commercialization inside 
and outside of football grounds. Dramatic economic changes had a widespread impact on 
the culture of the game as well as the game itself. Manchester United grew with their 
success, cemented themselves as an iconic representation of their culture and maintained 
an important relationship with their community and fans. I argue the Glazers takeover 
upset that balance between the club and the local community, and that through protest 
fans tried to maintain influence in a market they had increasingly less control over. The 
fan culture in England experienced a re-working similar to the scale of the economics, 
and with similar motivations as well. 
Like much of British society, class was enormously influential in the development 
of clubs in the early days of the organized game. Manchester United was founded by 
workers of the Lancashire-Yorkshire Railway workers’ union in the late 19th century, 
and maintained a strong tie to labour culture in arguably the most influential city of the 
Industrial Revolution.33 The takeover by American billionaire Malcolm Glazer in 2005 
sparked protest from many local supporters, as well as debate amongst fans over the 
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identity of the club and its connection, or lack thereof, to the people of Manchester. One 
section of supporters broke away from the club entirely to start a new club at the bottom 
of the English league system. Paired with the club’s growth of support across the world, 
the modern era of commercial success was juxtaposed with an identity crisis among 
supporters who suddenly questioned whether the club was still the same one they’d 
supported for so long.  
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CHAPTER II – AN END IS A START: THE FORMATION OF THE PREMIER 
LEAGUE 
There was a dramatic power shift in the institutional control of English football in 
the early 1990s. The English Football League’s First Division had lost traction with clubs 
because of its restrictive measures and lack of entrepreneurship. For decades, the nation’s 
top professional football clubs had been on a trajectory of strength and success in the 
game itself, but this did not reflect in the financial well-being of English clubs. In this 
chapter, I will demonstrate that many of England’s biggest clubs, especially Manchester 
United and Arsenal, were conscious of this, and made efforts to maximize their revenue 
and to influence the governing structure of English football in order to create a new top 
flight division, the English Premier League. This shift among the clubs at the top of the 
game laid the groundwork for transformational restructuring of the English top flight and 
had a lasting impact on the sport as a whole. These changes and the people who pushed 
for them were aided by club commercialization and evolving understandings of the 
football economy and regulation, including the impact of severe and tragic stadium 
incidents. Football governance in England became more focused on economic growth 
and sustainability, and the result was a well-oiled, commercially driven football product.  
The Premier League became one of the most followed sporting leagues in the 
world, and took over at an advantageous time in the rise of the digital age. Mass media, 
the internet, and international television broadcasting all aided the Premier League in 
becoming a sporting superpower. English football clubs were not always run in such a 
capitalistic way, but the structure of the English league system is quite reminiscent of a 
free market hierarchy. Unlike professional leagues in the United States, teams were not 
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guaranteed a spot in the league for the next season. Teams compete for a league position 
every year, and the teams that finish in the bottom three to four spots in every league 
division were relegated to the division below. At the top of the league table, the top three 
to four teams from the lower divisions below got promoted every season. The system is 
referred to as the Football Pyramid, and was the basic structure of league football 
throughout the world, with Major League Soccer in the United States being a notable 
exception.  
The inception of the Premier League and its replacing of the old First Division did 
not dismantle the English Football Pyramid. There remains a promotion/relegation 
system, which maintains a strong link between the professional and semi-professional 
leagues. This link is crucial for keeping small-town football clubs alive, even if a path to 
the top is not easy. The sponsorship, partnership, and television deals that the reformation 
allowed for increased revenue for the leagues and clubs at an unprecedented rate. 
However, as I will explore in this chapter, the reformation led to a greater wealth gap 
between the Premier League and lower divisions, and created an enormous financial 
advantage for clubs that stay in the Premier League safely for an extended period of time. 
While the Premier League enhanced the financial stability of clubs at the top of the 
pyramid the wealth did not trickle down, and the drop off of relegation came with an 
even greater penalty that threatened the existence of some clubs. The clubs that benefited 
most from the system were the very same that led efforts for its creation, and the shift 
towards commercialism in the sport aided the consolidation of power by these clubs over 
England’s top competitions and qualification spots for European tournaments.  
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The chapter will also demonstrate that although the Premier League era began 
because of financial motivations by club owners and executives, the situation that 
allowed for its creation was one of tragedy and social disorder. English football had a 
problem with hooliganism that boiled over in multiple ugly instances, attracting the 
attention of the British government. Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative Party in the 
1980s were intent on addressing hooliganism, and incidents such as the Heysel Stadium 
Disaster in 1985 and the Hillsborough Disaster in 1989 furthered calls for reform in 
England’s national pastime. Government interference prompted mixed reception, but 
created the opportunity that club executives desired to break away from the football 
league and create the Premier League.  
The Heysel and Hillsborough Incidents and the Transformation of English Football 
There are two key events that influenced a more economic and capitalistic 
approach to managing clubs and, eventually, the league as a whole. The first was the 
Heysel Stadium Disaster at the 1985 European Cup Final in Brussels, Belgium. Liverpool 
was the perennial champion of both England and Europe in the 1970s and 1980s, and 
were set to play in yet another European Cup Final at the end of the 1984/85 season. 
Their opponents in the 1985 European Cup, Italian giants Juventus, were underdogs, 
expected to fall to yet another English champion. Before the match however, an 
altercation broke out between sets of Liverpool and Juventus fans.  
The opposing fan sections were divided only by a small chain link fence and a 
thin line of Belgian police. Liverpool supporters, the instigators of the incident, began 
throwing flares, rocks, and chunks of concrete that littered the deteriorating stadium. 
Liverpool fans tore at the barriers as well, and eventually many of them broke through the 
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barrier and charged at the Juventus supporters.34 A riot ensued, and many fans crushed 
each other against barriers as Liverpool supporters poured into the Juventus section. 
Many fans forced their way out of the stands entirely and onto the track surrounding the 
football pitch, but were met by Belgian police who were waiting to attack them. The 
assumption by authorities was that a pitch invasion was taking place, but a much more 
troubling and violent attack exploded. A portion of the Juventus stand collapsed, and as 
fans attempted to escape the chaos, many trampled or crushed each other. In total, there 
were thirty-nine Italian and Belgian fans killed with hundreds more injured because of 
the riot and collapse started by violent Liverpool supporters.35  
 Police, stadium officials, and fans shared the blame for the disaster, but Liverpool 
supporters, and English fans in general, bore the most of the blame. In total, twenty-six 
Liverpool supporters faced charges for their role in starting the stadium riot.36 The only 
extraditable charge that could be levelled against them was manslaughter, but additional 
charges of assault were added upon their arrival in Belgium. The court convicted fourteen 
fans of charges for manslaughter and assault, and handed down three-year sentences.37 A 
handful of stadium officials were charged as well, and the poor upkeep of Heysel 
Stadium started a dialogue on the serious danger that crumbling stadium infrastructure 
posed to fans. Officials were well aware of the poor state of Heysel stadium, something 
accentuated by the chunks of concrete littering the stands of the stadium. These were 
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even used as projectiles by both sets of fans, and perhaps a symbol of the dramatic decay 
in the sport and culture both literally and figuratively.  
Though Heysel did not happen in England, it was a full display of the problems in 
English football that absolutely had to be addressed in the immediate years after. The 
English government saw this, and noticed the inaction of the English FA and Football 
League in the wake of this disaster. The question of government intervention was raised, 
and later in 1985 Parliament voted for football fan-focused legislation, The Sporting 
Events Act of 1985, which limits the sale and consumption of alcohol in football 
stadiums. The act specifically addresses the consumption of alcohol within sight of the 
football pitch, and states the crime is even punishable with prison time, depending on the 
severity.38 This is clear evidence of the concerns in England about football issues being a 
public safety issue. The consequences of the Heysel Disaster were deemed necessary by 
the Tory government especially, who through legislation demonstrated an eagerness to 
prevent and punish future incidents to greater effect. Despite the effects that the clubs 
knew would come, there was little doubt among directors and board members that 
English football needed a culture change.  
There was an established reputation amongst English football fans for 
hooliganism dating back to the 1950s and 1960s.39 Alhough there were no incidents to 
the scale of Heysel, many clubs, and even the English national team, were followed by 
football firms. Football firms were essentially gangs of supporters that provoked 
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altercations with each other and the police or other stadium security/authority, all in the 
name of supporting their team. Teams across Europe were followed by firms, but the 
culture thrived in Britain in the second half of the 20th Century. Though some only 
sought to follow the club, others were used as vessels for neo-Nazi and far-right white 
nationalist demonstrations. By the 1980s the culture had gotten out of hand. Fighting 
inside and outside football grounds, stabbings and gang attacks, and even rioting were 
responsible for making football a public safety issue. Heysel was not the first major 
incident of hooliganism in 1985, and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher set up a 
committee earlier that year for the purpose of combating hooliganism at football 
grounds.40 A riot in London after a Luton Town vs. Millwall match the same year 
prompted the move by Thatcher, and this would not be the last time the government 
would have to get involved in the governance of the game.  
Hooliganism from British supporters of English clubs was tolerated without 
significant action for some time, but the Heysel Disaster was also the last straw for 
UEFA, the governing body of European football. The organization passed down a five-
year ban from European competitions to all English clubs, which remained in place until 
the 1990/91 season for the UEFA Cup and European Cup Winners’ Cup, and 1991/92 for 
the European Cup.41 The European competitions ban seriously impacted the longterm 
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competitiveness of English clubs in Europe. It would be several years before English 
teams would come close to replicating dominance in Europe that was on display nearly 
every season in the 1970s and 1980s. From 1990 it would be nearly a decade before 
Manchester United became the first English team to once again win the European Cup, 
rebranded as the UEFA Champions League in 1992.42  
The second of the key stadium disasters to transform the future of English football 
was the Hillsborough Disaster, a stadium collapse incident that occurred at an FA Cup 
Semi-Final match between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest on April 15, 1989. The 
match took place at Sheffield Wednesday’s Hillsborough Stadium in Sheffield, England, 
where an overcrowded standing section of the west stand collapsed. Over three thousand 
Liverpool fans were crowded into their designated section behind one of the goals. The 
listed safety capacity however was around two thousand, but should have been listed 
around one thousand-six hundred according to the Taylor Report.43 South Yorkshire 
Police and even Liverpool goalkeeper Bruce Grobbelaar noticed fans packed tightly 
against the fenced barrier asking for help, but it was not until after the section collapse 
that it became clear to police that something had happened. Many people died of 
asphyxia before the stadium collapse had occurred because of the severe overcrowding 
that pushed the front rows of fans forward against the fence and barriers.44 The stampede 
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that followed after the collapse caused even more deaths and injuries from crushing. Fans 
poured through holes in the fencing and barricades separating them from the pitch, and 
turned back to help those trapped and injured climb out of the pile however they could. 
Police stopped the match and allowed fans onto the pitch when the situation became 
clear, but by then much of the damage was done.  
In the Hillsborough Disaster, ninety-six Liverpool fans died, prompting a 
thorough investigation by football and government authorities into the causes, both 
human and structural. The entire footballing community mourned the disaster and the 
pain football fans suffered because of the incompetence of the South Yorkshire Police 
and the misinformation campaign pushed by law enforcement and government officials 
which blamed Liverpool supporters for the incident.45  
Hillsborough sent shockwaves through English football, and justifiably became a 
cornerstone moment in the evolution of the sport in England. Economists Jonathan Clegg 
and Joshua Robinson describe the Hillsborough Disaster well in their history of the 
English Premier League, The Club. They write: 
[Hillsborough] was more than the deadliest stadium catastrophe in British history. 
It was a calamity that has blighted the lives of thousands; led to more than two 
decades of smears, cover-ups, and outright lies by culpable authorities; and raised 
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a series of deeply troubling social, political, and economic questions. To this day, 
Britain is still grappling with the fallout.46 
 
Hillsborough impacted football in a number of ways, others of which will be discussed in 
the next chapter, but one immediate impact on the footballing economy was the demand 
for stadium restructuring. The Taylor Report, published in January, 1990 by Lord Justice 
Peter Taylor upon his investigation into the disaster, cited a number of safety hazards that 
played a role in the deaths and injuries at Hillsborough, including mismanagement by the 
South Yorkshire Police and stadium structural failure.47  
New safety measures passed by Parliament, the Football Licensing Authority, and 
even language from the Taylor Report began a stadium reformation era, and a transition 
into all-seating stadiums. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and the British government 
took the opportunity to get involved where the FA did not, and passed sweeping 
legislation addressing problems of both Heysel and Hillsborough. Even before the Heysel 
disaster in 1985 there was debate in the House of Commons about quelling crowd 
violence, with an emphasis on protecting police officers. One Tory MP reported the 
Metropolitan Police alone had sustained 83 injuries during the 1984/85 season, with 
several requiring hospitalisation.48 Parliament passed the Football Spectators Act later in 
1989, which introduced a number of legislative measures, restrictions, and definitions in 
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English football. “Violence” and “Disorder” at or around a football match became a 
criminal offense, which could result in a banning order and prison time, depending on the 
severity of the crime. The act also gave definition to “Disorder,” which included the use 
of threatening language, display of threatening language, or targeted hate against specific 
groups of people, and specifically outlined “racial hatred” as an offense.49 
Police were also given power to designate a crime as a “football related offence” 
if the crime occurred within twenty-four hours before or after a match, as long as there 
was sufficient evidence the perpetrator was associated with a football match or football 
gang.50 Spectator violence was specifically defined as violence against “persons” or 
“property,” which turned some heads when it was enacted after Hillsborough, which was 
not an incident of fan violence.51 Police notably dodged responsibility for the disaster 
despite the conclusions of the Taylor report, and fed a misinformation campaign in the 
press. Tabloid paper The Sun ran a story claiming sensationalist and untrue allegations of 
hooliganism during the disaster. A large headline reading “The Truth,” was followed with 
outrageous allegations that claimed fans “picked pockets of the victims,” “urinated on the 
brave cops,” and “beat up PC giving kiss of life.”52 The feature, published just four days 
after the disaster, was later deemed false by an independent inquiry into Hillsborough, an 
inquiry which ruled the police and local government had worked extensively to cover up 
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their wrongdoing in the disaster by encouraging a smear campaign against the victims 
and survivors to paint them as drunken hooligans.53  
Newspapers at the time seemed to understand the British government’s 
involvement in the matter as a direct reflection of Thatcher’s interest in Britain’s image 
abroad, and not an interest in improving football. Her legacy in football is associated 
directly with the legacy of Hillsborough, and the ugly way in which she painted football 
fans. She was hesitant to show support to the Taylor report because of the blame it placed 
on police, and believed it could encourage more aggressive behavior from Liverpool fans 
towards authority.54 The Sunday Independent described her push of the Spectators’ Bill in 
1989 as “duplicitous,” implying her involvement in football was a noble but misguided 
attempt to combat a serious problem in the game.55 Thatcher and Parliament’s responses 
focused on the violence specifically, which showed an urgency to prevent further 
displays of public hooliganism. Concerns about cultural decay in football through 
hooliganism were, however, shared by administrators of the sport. Club chairmen at First 
Division clubs had long sought an excuse to reform stadiums and increase matchday 
revenue, and discussions had already taken place regarding sale of television rights as a 
way to fund stadium renovation.56 Leaders in the top league of the sport took the situation 
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seriously, and the FA, Football League, and clubs all complied with the change in 
governance.  
 For big, wealthy clubs like Manchester United and Arsenal, the news of new 
stadium regulations and upkeep measures was in a way quite welcome. Martin Edwards, 
the majority owner and club chairman of Manchester United, and David Dein, club 
chairman of Arsenal, wanted to run their respective clubs with more attention to business 
and free enterprise. To improve their product, they needed to create a safer, more 
enjoyable stadium experience that attracted higher attendance and matchday spending. 
Dein in particular was absolutely disgusted by the state of Highbury Stadium, which did 
not even feature a proper bathroom.57 All-seated stadiums did, however, require 
renovation and out of pocket expenses that many lower league clubs could not afford. 
This raised more questions about the responsibility of the league and football governing 
bodies to  aiding clubs that could not meet the new regulations while other clubs were 
able to simply rebuild huge sections of their stadium, or even fund a new stadium 
altogether. Lower league sides campaigned for a relaxation of the policy that allowed a 
stadium transition within their budgets, and eventually the government agreed to 
subsidize a portion of stadium conversions.58 Such involvement by the government in 
football was unprecedented, but the new policies were successful in preventing 
overcrowding and crushing incidents. They also allowed for tighter regulation of fans 
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entering the stadium, sectioning for potentially disruptive and violent supporters’ groups, 
and a gradual increase in ticket prices as clubs looked to maximize matchday revenue.   
 Heysel and Hillsborough were tragic events that rocked English football to its 
core. These incidents brought a number of long-festering issues within  the English game 
into the spotlight, and the British government’s involvement highlighted the severity of 
the situation. Historian David Goldblatt argued in his book The Game of our Lives that 
the English FA was largely absent from football governance since its inception in 1863, 
which resulted in a serious crisis for the survival of the game.59 The tragedies and 
hooliganism brought the mismanagement into public safety discourse, and the FA faced a 
reckoning in the 1980s. The government stepped in where the FA did nothing, and after 
over 100 years of being left to its own devices, Parliament began taking a serious interest 
in public policy concerning football. “[The FA’s] autonomy from both political and 
economic power was crumbling,” Goldblatt writes. “Hillsborough and its judicial 
aftermath drew the entire football industry into an extended and now semi permanent 
relationship with the state.”60 In the late 1980s English football entered a period where 
unprecedented change was both possible and necessary. The FA, which was more than 
willing to negotiate with clubs over the formation of the Premier League, had historically 
deferred micro-management of clubs to the Football League, but began assisting the 
biggest and richest clubs in their coup.  
The merging factors of increase in club expenses, and attempts by the league and 
top clubs to provide relief for smaller clubs, led many wealthier clubs to consider a push 
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for more voting and representative power in the FA and Football League decision-
making. Despite the new commercial focus from individual clubs, the impact on English 
football as a whole in the late 1980s had yet to manifest in a breakaway or television deal, 
but clubs were looking to increase their influence on the governance of the game in a way 
that clubs could maximize revenue across the league. Maximizing revenue became a 
primary focus for many clubs as expenses piled up in the wake of stadium reform, but, in 
fact, revenue had been a major focus in the top division for some time by the time 
Hillsborough happened. Bigger clubs like Manchester United and Liverpool began this 
shift in focus as a means of funding their efforts to remain big clubs in the 1970s. 
Advertising deals between clubs and commercial partners increased in both occurrence 
and profit for clubs with global exposure and reputation. At this time there was also the 
emergence of shirt sponsorship deals emerged, in which companies paid a club for the 
right to display their brand logo on the team shirt. Though this practice is universal in the 
modern game, it was unprecedented at the top of the English league pyramid before 
Liverpool brokered a deal with Japanese company Hitachi in 1979.61 Even shirt and kit 
manufacturing deals were not as common as they are in the game now, and the top clubs 
began to focus on these as extra avenues of cash as well. Manufacturers such as Adidas, 
Umbro, and Puma were happy to oblige as clubs began demanding higher payments for 
the right to produce official club gear and merchandise. This was a particularly useful 
practice for clubs whose ownership shares were bought up at higher rates by individual 
people or corporate groups. Ownership takeover was costly, and owners saw these deals 
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as a means to replenish the out of pocket expenses that takeovers required, immediately 
putting a revenue stream into the club to help fund expenses.   
Though the formation of the Premier League did not happen until the 1992/93 season, the 
groundwork was laid by the big clubs for years prior.  
Founding the Premier League 
The top clubs in the First Division took it upon themselves to discuss the 
formation of a new league, one in which they had more say over league governance and 
marketing. Arsenal and Manchester United chairmen, David Dein and Martin Edwards 
respectively, led the charge, and were joined by club executives from Tottenham, 
Liverpool, and Everton as well in their frequent meetings, which were aimed at creating a 
shared emphasis on economic, revenue-focused approaches to club management.62 They 
looked to drum up support in television, meeting with television executives from multiple 
broadcasters in hopes of creating a bidding war, and companies ITV and BSkyB quickly 
emerged as the leading contenders.63 Though there was financial motivation for the FA as 
well as the clubs, and revenue growth after 1992 demonstrated this, the FA’s rapid 
growth was only a fraction of the profit that certain individual clubs would receive. 
Between 1990 and 2011 the FA’s turnover grew from £3-4 million to over £300 million, 
and still the FA’s economic growth was only “about the same economic size as a single 
big club.”64 Clubs also held significant voting power in the Premier League. Each active 
club is considered a “shareholder” of the Premier League, and, since the Premier League 
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is autonomous from the Football League, clubs in the Premier League only need to 
achieve a majority vote of fourteen out of twenty clubs to pass proposed amendments.65 
The influence of the biggest clubs in the country manifested in voting power in the form 
of the Premier League, which was a remarkable demonstration of economic will. Clubs 
took advantage of the power vacuum in the sport, and created a more profitable, and 
eventually a more accessible and entertaining, footballing product.  
The breakaway agenda went through officially in May1992. Though the Football 
League did not want to lose its management of the First Division, the FA backing off the 
Premier League plan meant that clubs were able to break away en masse to form the 
Premier League for the start of the 1992/93 season. Clubs were ready to back the 
breakaway with the knowledge that television revenue would be secured via a deal with 
either BSkyB or ITV that summer. Australian entrepreneur Rupert Murdoch, who was a 
constant figure in Margaret Thatcher’s new privatized British economy, saw the 
television deal as a potentially monumental moment for his young satellite broadcasting 
company. Murdoch, aware of the serious competition for television rights, decided to pull 
the trigger and bid for the exclusive live broadcasting rights to the Premier League with 
BBC’s Match of the Day securing the weekend highlights and wrap-up show.66 BSkyB’s 
joint offer with the BBC was worth around £300 million, a much improved offer on their 
initial proposal. Interest from terrestrial broadcasting company ITV increased when it 
was clear the Premier League breakaway would take place, and details of their massive 
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bid were leaked to BSkyB leading up to the league’s vote on which television deal they 
would accept.  
The details of the breakaway and broadcasting battle were followed closely by 
British journalists, and the drama of the Premier League’s formation and television 
bidding war was nearly as enthralling as Leeds United’s First Division title race with 
Manchester United. The drama really took off when it was discovered that ITV’s 
improved offer was leaked to BSkyB days before the Premier League was set to vote, 
prompting Murdoch’s company to up their bid. The clubs narrowly voted, fourteen to six, 
in favor of the BSkyB deal. ITV was furious, and the company sought legal action 
against the Premier League and its executive, Rick Parry. ITV had not learned of 
BSkyB’s improved bid until after the result of the vote, and had assumed there was 
something happening under the table.  In fact, someone had informed BSkyB of the rival 
offer in advance, but not ITV when BSkyB upped their own bid. The Daily Mirror 
reported that Alan Sugar had phoned BSkyB to tell them of ITV’s deal, and said, “blow 
them out of the water.”67 Sugar, who had previous ties to Murdoch in business, became a 
part owner of Tottenham Hotspur in 1991, and was thus involved in the broadcasting vote 
as a representative of the North London club. The report was covered sensationalistically, 
and the dispute between the broadcasting companies and the Premier League became 
very public.  
ITV accused the Premier League and their negotiators of “sabotage,” and 
demanded more time to adjust their offer.68 ITV went after the FA as well, and submitted 
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a writ against both the FA and the Premier League, seeking damages after losing the 
rights to FA Cup broadcasting later that same summer.69 ITV and Channel 4 were 
terrestrial channels in the UK, meaning that its content was broadcast publicly via 
broadcast waves rather than privately, and largely maintained a monopoly on British 
television. The exclusivity of BSkyB as a satellite company was a threat to the very 
method of television broadcasting, and the deal with the Premier League was indeed a 
monumental shift towards satellite television in Britain. It was yet another revolutionary 
result of the moment, and gave the Premier League even more hype going into the first 
season. BSkyB and the Premier League were both winners in that regard.  
Accusations of greediness on the part of the clubs was not necessarily incorrect, 
but it was a transition long in the making behind the scenes. Channel 4, another television 
network, feared this sort of mega-deal, claiming BSkyB could “devour” them before 
long.70 The BBC had concerns initially, but became a strong ally in the takeover bid with 
acquisition of rights to the FA Cup and the revival of weekend wrap-up show Match of 
the Day.71 The Premier League simply replaced the old first division, and the addition of 
the BBC, the most storied and respected British broadcasting institution, to its ranks gave 
the transition a much more normal feel. English club football well and truly became a 
capitalist venture. In American fashion, Sky TV helped to flex out the schedule of games 
to accommodate television viewers all weekend long, and even incorporated a Premier 
League edition of Monday Night Football to broadcast, usually, one of the more 
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intriguing matchups of the weekend in a prime-time weekday slot.72 The set up was 
complete with half-time analysis, sports talk shows before and after match-days, and 
noticeably improved television production quality. Murdoch and Sky spared no expense 
in their efforts to make the Premier League viewing experience elite.  
Jonathan Clegg and Joshua Robinson view the Premier League deal as a fairly 
substantial risk for BSkyB to have taken considering the state of English Football at the 
time, a company that was moving along slowly to convince viewers of their satellite 
television package.73 Murdoch’s company was in serious debt, nearly 2bn pounds, after 
he successfully merged his Sky TV with another broadcaster, BSB, in 1990.74 Two years 
later the company was still treading water, and struggling to attract subscribers. Exclusive 
rights to Premier League broadcasting would not immediately change the company’s 
fortunes, but offered a long-term avenue of profitability and customer loyalty by 
broadcasting the most popular sport in the country. Though it was impossible to predict 
just how much the sports broadcasting market would explode over the coming decades, it 
was certainly easy to see the potential for it. The National Football League in the United 
States proved its sporting dominance through the value of its television deals, and the 
same potential was seen in Britain by Murdoch and club chairmen.75 There was demand 
for greater coverage of live football matches on television, and the Premier League’s 
founders saw this as a significant source of marketing and revenue.   
 
72 Clegg and Robinson, The Club, 87-88. 
73 Clegg and Robinson. The Club. 32-33. 
74 Mihir Bose, Game Changer: How the English Premier League Came to Dominate the World. 
(Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2012), 76. 
75 Clegg and Robinson. The Club. 52.  
 
43 
Along with the risk of significant financial loss, the product came with a 
substantial public relations burden when it came to the hooliganism of English fans. 
Memory of the Heysel Stadium Disaster in 1985 was alive and well, even in the minds of 
Britons themselves. Many had been turned off the sport due to the deterioration of the in-
person experience, and politicians, especially the Margaret Thatcher-led Conservative 
majority, often sided against fans. It was not uncommon for Britons to be looked down 
upon in the sport and its culture rather intensely, even after the post-Heysel and 
Hillsborough reforms and Football Spectators Act of 1989. An England semi-final run at 
the 1990 FIFA World Cup, hosted in Italy, paired with more hooliganism and arrests by 
fans travelling abroad, and clashes with Italian police dominated headlines around the 
world.76 The reputation was persistent with English football’s history, but there was also 
evidence that the domestic game was cleaning itself up.  
Hoooliganism’s legacy in England, though fresh on the mind in the Premier 
League era, was beginning to dissipate. Football arrests dramatically decreased over the 
next two decades, and by the 2010s it was considered an annoyance rather than a public 
safety issue. “Hooliganism, which was once considered a cancer, is now more like a cold 
sore,” football writer Sean Ingle wrote for The Guardian. “[Hooliganism is] an irritation 
that flares up every so often rather than something that people feared could be 
terminal.”77 The tone began to change in the early 1990s, and UEFA lifted its post-Heysel 
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ban on English clubs competing in European competitions, but there was still the threat 
that English football would fail to reach its former heights competitively. The 
Hillsborough Disaster had also generated a lot of sympathy for English fans, and shed 
light on the role of authority in causing incidents. The rebranding of English football 
included its international image, and the increase in oversight by both the government 
and footballing bodies did result in diminishing fan violence. Arrest records show that 
between 1989 and 1992 the average number of total fan arrests of clubs from all four 
league divisions decreased by almost two-thousand.78  
Big Four, Big Six, and Big Issues 
Though it is easy to trace the emergence of profit-focused methods by the football 
league, this did not always translate to success for clubs. The massive gap in annual 
revenue that came with playing in the Premier league versus playing in the 2nd division, 
now called the Championship division, was a tremendous motivation for clubs to avoid 
relegation. Television revenue increased with each deal the Premier League signed, both 
domestically and internationally. Teams that kept their quality year in and year out did 
not have much problem financially, and there was a clear consolidation of power for the 
best teams. These were the teams that could afford to keep spending to compete rather 
than relying on their ability to develop quality talent.  
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The wealth gap that grew between the Premier League and the Championship 
division exacerbated the wealth gap between teams at or near the highest level of play. 
Football economist Stefan Szymanski wrote that the general understanding in football 
economics in the early Premier League era was that clubs often had to spend more than 
they made in order to win. However, in Manchester United Szymanski found a unique 
pairing of profitability and sporting success.79 Szymanski’s article was written in 1998, 
just one year after Manchester United’s fourth Premier League title in five years, and 
claimed that Manchester United was picking up steam as both an economic and sporting 
force without buckling under the financial weight of sporting sustainability. Manager 
Alex Ferguson, knighted as Sir Alex Ferguson in 1999, turned the club into a dynasty in 
the 1990s. The success continued into the 2000s as the club and Premier League grew 
into global brands respectively, and their popularity exploded worldwide. The Premier 
League offered an enormous platform to whatever clubs could win, and Manchester 
United took full advantage of the opening for a new power in English football.  
The formation of the Premier League for the 1992/93 season came at an 
interesting time for shifting power in the game as well. Liverpool, who had dominated 
football in the 1970s and 1980s, declined in form dramatically in the 1990s. The power 
vacuum left by Liverpool for the rest of the league to compete did inspire English fans at 
the start of the Premier League era. Clubs such as Aston Villa, Norwich City, and 
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Blackburn Rovers became surprising competitors with Arsenal and Leeds United for the 
league title, and Manchester United, who had been complacent since their first period of 
league success ended in the early 1970s.80 Manchester United won the first ever Premier 
League title in 1993, and repeated as champions four more times throughout the decade.81 
In 1993/94 and 1995/96 the club completed Premier League and FA Cup doubles, and 
won an unprecedented English Treble in 1998/99 by winning the Premier League, FA 
Cup, and UEFA Champions League. Manchester United’s hegemony in the first two 
decades of the Premier League was challenged by only a handful of teams. Arsenal were 
champions in 1997/98, 2001/02, and 2003/04, and Chelsea in 2004/05, 2005/06, and 
2009/10, but they were the only two clubs that consistently challenged Manchester 
United in that time.82 Arsenal were an established team historically, and well-funded as 
one of London’s top clubs. Chelsea on the other hand represented a very different threat, 
the threat of a nouveau riche club owned by an individual willing and able to spend 
whatever amount of money was necessary to build a world class team. Manchester City, 
another new money team, emerged in the 2010s, winning four league titles in that decade, 
but Chelsea were the first to make a major splash in the Premier League era. 
The Big Four, which consisted of Manchester United, Arsenal, Chelsea, and 
Liverpool, emerged in the mid-2000s, but in reality the groundwork for their dominance 
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had been laid in the 1990s. The league successes mentioned previously demonstrates just 
how consistent they were, and that did not include the FA Cup or English Football 
League Cup. Since 1992 the FA Cup has only been won by a team other than the Big 
Four on 5 occasions, and two of those belong to Manchester City, after the team was 
bought by Sheikh Mansourin 2008.83 In fact, the Big Four quickly became the Big Six, 
with the addition of the aforementioned Manchester City and North London club 
Tottenham Hotspur. Though they were not traditional powers of English Football, 
Manchester City and Tottenham both developed nicely under new ownership in the 
Premier League era, and earned consideration as contenders for silverware nearly every 
season.84 The novel and consistent advantage for each of these clubs was, of course, 
money. The higher a club finished in the final Premier League table the more prize 
money they won, and finishing in a qualification spot for European competitions, 
especially the UEFA Champions League, guaranteed extra competition and television 
revenue for the next season. However, the most important factor in club financing 
became whether the ownership behind a club was able to  provide both a sustainable 
source of money for club expenses and a willingness to spend big on a winning team. 
Though many smaller clubs were able to finish high in the Premier League table in the 
1990s, this became increasingly rare from the 2000s on.85  
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The influence of wealthy ownership was especially demonstrated by Chelsea in 
west London. The club had experienced some success in the late 1990s, but ascended to 
true contender status when the club was bought by Russian billionaire oligarch Roman 
Abramovich in 2003. Abramovich was known for his ambition as an early Vladimir Putin 
backer and NTV state news owner, and was equally ambitious in football, spending a 
fortune for Chelsea to achieve success domestically and in Europe immediately following 
his takeover.86 At this time, the Premier League and UEFA had no regulatory measures 
on club spending, which meant that as long as a club could sustain itself financially, it 
could spend whatever amount it deemed necessary on player transfers. In Abramovich’s 
first season in charge the club spent nearly £200 million on transfers, an amount greater 
than the club’s previous six seasons combined.87 As a result, on the field Chelsea 
competed toe-to-toe with Manchester United and Arsenal in the early 2000s, and won the 
Premier League in 2004/05, their first league title since 1954/55.88  
Liverpool established themselves as the most successful English club by 
dominating the league, cup, and European competitions in the 1970s and 1980s, but did 
not win another league title until 2019/20 after the inception of the Premier League. They 
remained a contender in cup competitions, but did not come near their past successes. 
Regardless, they remained one of the better teams in England throughout this time, 
finishing near the top in every Premier League season, and even won another UEFA 
Champions League title in 2004/05. Players such as Steven Gerrard, Xabi Alonso, and 
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Fernando Torres were regarded as some of the best in the world at their respective 
positions, but they couldn’t topple Manchester United, Arsenal, or Chelsea for league 
supremacy. A reason for this was the lack of continuity for this particular team. Alonso 
and Torres were both sold between 2009 and 2011, and an ownership dispute between 
shareholders. American investor John W. Henry and his Fenway Sports Group bought the 
majority shares of the club in 2010, and brought greater stability. Able to fund moves for 
star players under new manager Jurgen Klopp Liverpool returned to prominence, winning 
the UEFA Champions League in 2019 and their first ever Premier League in 2020.  
The Premier League had without a doubt become a primarily profit-driven league, 
and with good fiscal reason. Though this came with added issues over the influence of 
money and corporate power over the game, and, as will be shown in the final chapter, 
fans in particular came to recognize many of the hindrances that corporate power placed 
on their agency and influence over the game. The economic takeaway here is the power 
of the profit motive, and the expansion of the Premier League market because of 
expanded television broadcasting. In 2019 the Premier League reported that it had 
broadcast the previous season to “188 of the world’s 193 countries,” and projected their 
programming reached an estimated audience of 1.35 billion.89 The worldwide appeal of 
the Premier League has made it incredibly profitable, and television revenue alone was 
reported around $1.88 billion in that same summer of 2019.90 Though initially it was the 
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domestic television broadcasting that brought in the biggest money, the expansion of the 
international audience has really cemented the Premier League’s profitability.  
The Premier League’s broadcasting rights were a highly valued commodity, and 
since the first BSkyB deal in 1992 that value only skyrocketed. The Premier League and 
Rupert Murdoch’s gamble on satellite television paid off big time, and the income would 
only grow from there. Murdoch’s American television broadcasting company, Fox, fed 
the United States soccer fever that began in the 1990s by providing Premier League, FA 
Cup, and UEFA Champions League coverage on the exclusive Fox Soccer Channel, 
which later became a part of the Fox Sports network of channels.  
  
Figure 191: Increase in value of Premier League Broadcasting rights in millions of Pounds Sterling.  
 
The Table above demonstrates the dramatic increase in value of broadcasting rights that 
turned the Premier League into a financial juggernaut. The increase of international 
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broadcasting value, and from 2010 on the new international value nearly equals the 
previous valuation of the domestic broadcasting rights package.  
The financial power of the Premier League was not always welcomed by players, 
managers, or fans of the sport. Though wages in the sport increased along with the value 
of the sport itself, players and managers were wary of the influence that profit has over 
player safety, crowded scheduling, and competitiveness. In fact, the only big club to vote 
for the initial BSkyB deal was Tottenham, represented by Alan Sugar, who fed BSkyB 
the information on ITV’s deal.92 Concerns focused on how scheduling of fixtures would 
be set, and whether outside parties would have more influence than clubs when it came to 
constructing a schedule catered to safe maintenance of player fitness. Manchester United 
manager Alex Ferguson saw the potential problems with broadcasting companies 
controlling league schedules, and scheduling games on Monday night and other 
weekdays. “A deal was stampeded without consultation with the most important people 
in the game,” Ferguson said of the deal in 1992. “The managers and the players whose 
livelihoods are at stake.”93 Arsene Wenger, Arsenal manager from 1996-2018, has 
similarly voiced displeasure with the control of television companies in setting football 
schedules. “We have sold our soul,” Wenger said, “It is the truth and I cannot say [the 
television influence] is wrong, but it is not normal that you can have direct influence on 
the schedule through TV.”94 Ferguson and Wenger, both highly influential figures in the 
game, highlighted a problem that persisted for big clubs in England. The Professional 
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Footballers’ Association, which represented the players, made some fuss over the issue as 
well, but were quickly sold on guarantees of increased compensation.95  
Manchester United, Arsenal, and the other big clubs maintained a vested interest 
in spreading games out more over the course of a season due to the greater number of 
games and competitions they played in as opposed to smaller clubs. Participants in 
European competitions played anywhere from six to sixteen more games per season than 
clubs that failed to qualify, and those clubs often advanced further in domestic cups such 
as the FA Cup and EFL Cup as well. The crowded fixtures enacted a physical toll on 
players, who were also subject to extra travelling between matches. Many of these bigger 
clubs played between fifty and sixty matches in a season, which took place between 
August and May of the following year. Despite the schedule complaints, and the massive 
financial pressure to perform, the biggest clubs were the ones who benefited most from 
the Premier League setup. It was fitting, as it was these clubs that led the realization of 
the Premier League, and their club owners and chairmen were the minds behind its 
inception. It was also ironic as it was their managers who were most concerned over 
television companies controlling fixture scheduling. Fiscally speaking, the Premier 
League became exactly what the big clubs hoped it would, and its participants each 
reaped enormous financial benefits because of it.  
However, importantly, the growing wealth gap made it more difficult for those 
teams that must be relegated to the lower division, and eventually prompted greater 
financial reliance by the Football League on the Premier League. With the start of the 
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2006/07 season, clubs relegated from the Premier League began to receive “parachute 
payments” as a safety net for financial survival as they adjust to playing in a lower, 
poorer division.96 The Football League and its clubs operated economically 
independently from the Premier League until this moment, and the worrying state of 
football clubs on the brink of bankruptcy prompted the Premier League to get involved. 
Parachute payments were made to relegated teams, and “solidarity” payments of £1 
million were made to each of the other EFL Championship clubs to help alleviate 
concerns of financial advantage for clubs receiving parachute payments.97 This created a 
quasi-welfare state in English football, and further demonstrated just how much the 
Premier League had grown apart from the Football League since the breakaway in 1992. 
Bearing partial financial responsibility for clubs in lower divisions was an interesting new 
precedent for a system based largely on competition, and was indicative of the danger 
posed to clubs that could not stay up in the Premier League. With three clubs guaranteed 
to be relegated each season there was guaranteed financial risk for every club, but the 
richest of the rich never faced such danger. Achieving success in the sport became more 
dependent on money than ever before.   
The problem of clubs unable to keep up with top flight sides competitively and 
financially was not new, but the wealth gap had made it nearly impossible for teams to 
rise from the ranks. Another issue was teams that were relegated from the Premier 
League buckled under the weight of financing their Premier League squads in lower 
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leagues, and there were some cases of relegated clubs declaring bankruptcy or dissolving 
entirely. Though it has largely been smaller clubs that have suffered this fate, there are 
examples of big, well-funded clubs such as Newcastle United and Leeds United that 
suffered relegation. Leeds United especially had an historic downfall that nearly led to 
the collapse of the club.  
Leeds United provides a remarkable example of the potential disasters that come 
with relegation. Leeds United were a team that challenged for the Premier League a 
couple times in the 1990s, and built a highly competitive team in the late 1990s and early 
2000s. They even reached the semi-final of the UEFA Champions League in 2001, losing 
to eventual runners-up Valencia.98 Within the next couple of seasons the club could no 
longer avoid the massive debt they had incurred, and they were forced to sell star players 
such as Rio Ferdinand, Jonathan Woodgate, and Robbie Keane.99 Leeds United were 
relegated from the Premier League at the end of the 2003/04 season, finishing in 
nineteenth place. Three years later, they finished bottom of the Championship division, 
and were relegated to League 1, the third tier of English league football. The club were 
penalized fifteen league points for the 2006/07, and their lackluster squad failed to make 
up the ground.100 In just six seasons, a club that was a challenger for the highest honor in 
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club football was struggling for survival in the English third tier. The collapse of Leeds 
United alarmed the Premier League, Football League, and the FA, and directly influenced 
the installment of parachute payments.101 Though the payments are still used, and gave 
significant aid to relegated sides, there were still cases of clubs falling and collapsing 
under the financial weight of their financial upkeep. Bolton Wanderers, Blackburn 
Rovers, and Portsmouth Football Club were three more examples of clubs that struggled 
with relegation, and remained in the lower divisions. Blackburn Rovers were Premier 
League Champions in 1994/95 and still had to sell their best player, Alan Shearer, in 
1996. Shearer joined Blackburn for a record fee in 1992, but success did not bring the 
financial stability needed to maintain the team.102 Blackburn declined soon after, and 
were relegated to the Championship division in 1998/99.103 The fall of clubs due to 
finances was indicative of the broad wealth gap between the leagues, as well as the 
immense power that Premier League money had on football clubs. Financial comfort was 
reserved for a few clubs at the top as the others fought desperately to stay alive and climb 
the ladder.  
The Premier League was a far from perfect sports model, but it served its 
founders well for what it set out to do. It made English football rich, and propped up 
some of the biggest clubs in the world on a nearly insurmountable pile of cash and 
trophies. The system spread too, and the game started to revolve almost entirely around 
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financial stability and revenue. It raised the competitive and economic stakes at every 
professional tier football, and honed in focus across the sport on maximizing revenue for 
clubs and competitions alike. Still problems remained in the world that the Premier 
League created, and the culture of the sport felt a dramatic shift as well. Fans and club 
life evolved in some unpredictable ways after the establishment of the Premier League.  
Money remained central to English football, and the fallout of commercial motivations 
was impactful at multiple levels of the sport. The moment that allowed for the Premier 
League’s foundation to occur was born out of reckoning with English football’s oldest 
and ugliest problems, many of which still needed to be addressed. Racism and 
xenophobia directed at players and fans of the sport continued the conversations about 
space and safety that Heysel and Hillsborough had started. Consolidation of club 
ownership under one person or corporate entity strengthened the fiscal and marketing 
power of clubs, but weakened the influence of fans and fan ownership groups. The 
expansion of club fandom internationally raised questions of cultural legitimacy within 
the mainstream. These are areas that will be explored in the next chapters.
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CHAPTER III  - SAME PLACE, DIFFERENT FACES: ANTI-RACIST ACTIVISM IN 
THE PREMIER LEAGUE’S FOOTBALL COMMUNITIES 
On January 25, 1995 Manchester United traveled to Selhurst Park in London to 
face Crystal Palace. Manchester United was closing out a hectic winter schedule in the 
middle of their quest for a third straight Premier League title. The score was 1-0 after the 
first half of play in a physical game, and Palace defender Richard Shaw had played 
particularly physically in defense while man-marking Manchester United’s star forward, 
Eric Cantona. Cantona, an already enigmatic figure within the Mancunian revival under 
Sir Alex Ferguson, had a bit of a reputation for his flair and attitude. A favorite among 
fans, and a villain among rivals, moments where he would get heated normally fueled his 
performances, but on this particular day he showed no such control. Frustrated with the 
referee’s lack of involvement in punishing the opposition’s aggressive play, Cantona 
emerged for the second half. "No yellow cards, then?” Cantona asked referee Alan 
Wilkie, followed up with a “Do your fucking job” from the Manchester United manager, 
Ferguson.104 Wilkie was unbothered by the pair, and continued to allow Palace’s 
aggressive defending to go unpunished against the champions, and just three minutes into 
the second half Cantona decided he had had enough. After wrestling for possession, 
Cantona lashed out and kicked Shaw. He was shown a red card immediately and sent off 
towards the dressing room.  
As Cantona was walking past the stands toward the tunnel, a Palace supporter, 
later identified as Matthew Simmons, ran down a few rows to shout abuse at the 
 




Frenchman. "You dirty French bastard,” Simmons shouted, “fuck off back to France." 
Cantona, without much hesitation, lunged with a kung fu kick at Simmons.105 He landed 
the kick square in the chest, and exchanged some weak punches with Simmons before 
being pulled away and escorted off the pitch. The match finished 1-1, with Palace 
utilizing their man advantage to equalize in the second half, but the headlines the next 
morning were focused solely on Cantona.  
The kick dominated news in the footballing world, with some saying he should 
have been banned from the sport for life. He was stripped of his captaincy of the French 
national team, fined £10,000 by the FA and £20,000 by Manchester United, and handed 
an eight-month ban from football.106 Even Ferguson initially believed that Cantona’s 
career would be over after seeing the footage of the incident for the first time, but soon 
changed his mind. The Frenchman was incredibly frustrated with the punishment and 
media frenzy that followed him after the incident, and requested that his contract be 
terminated by Manchester United.107 Ferguson, however, persisted, and Cantona decided 
to wait out the rest of his ban and return near the mid-way point of the 1995/96 season.   
Ferguson’s backing of Cantona was a surprising but ultimately correct decision 
that helped cement the legacy of both manager and player. He came back for two more 
seasons after his suspension, helping his team win the Premier League in both years, with 
one FA Cup trophy as well, before retiring at 31 to pursue a career in acting and 
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writing.108 The incident itself took on a complicated legacy in terms of the relationship 
between players and supporters, and was significant in changing the narrative around 
abuse directed at players. Acts of xenophobic and racist abuse by fans had long plagued 
the sport in England, and this incident empowered other players despite the controversy 
around Cantona’s violent actions. His act symbolized many players’ frustrations with 
dealing with aggressive, often nationalistic, English fans. This chapter analyzes the 
problem of racism and anti-foreign sentiment in the Premier League era, showing how 
the game adapted to deal with issues such as racist abuse, the presence of hate groups, 
and abusive supporters inside and outside of football spaces. All of this must be placed 
within the context of the commercialization described in the previous chapter, as it was 
central to the diversification of the English game by giving English clubs the financial 
flexibility to attract top foreign players and managers. The expansion of the Premier 
League to international TV markets also gave added incentive to cleanse football grounds 
of racist behavior, although these efforts were well underway before the formation of the 
Premier League, through anti-racist activism and the increased presence of black British 
footballers.  
The context of racism in English football leading into the Premier League era 
must therefore be unpacked, as well as the impacts of multiculturalism and globalization 
in European football. The formation of the Premier League came at a time when efforts to 
clean up fan violence were taking place at multiple levels of the game and society. By 
commercializing and internationalizing, the Premier League created higher stakes for 
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pushing racism out of the sport, and in many ways it depended on the diversification and 
activism of its communities in these efforts. Activism by fans, players, clubs, and the 
Premier League through groups like Kick It Out was crucial in showing solidarity with 
players and advocating for safer football environments. Scholars Emy Onuora and Brett 
Bebber have demonstrated the significance of this period of transition in regard to racism 
in the English game, and regardless of the success or failure of anti-racism measures or 
new models of club management and ownership, they were shaped by the marketability 
of the Premier League on a global stage. In this chapter I focus more on the agency 
within the game itself rather than government involvement discussed in the previous 
chapter because of the importance of cultural intersections and marketing campaigns in 
embracing a new age of the English game. Fan and player activists played crucial roles in 
raising awareness of issues of racism and took matters into their own hands through 
campaigns, advocate groups, and advertisement. Even the very presence of anti-racist 
activism and increase in diversity and visibility fostered environments for change, even in 
areas where institutional help was not offered.  
Racism, Activism, and Multiculturalism in the English Game  
Fan racism in England was notoriously bad in the 1970s and 1980s, fueled by the 
jingoist language of conservatives and far-right movements of the time in response to the 
growing population of black immigrants and British commonwealth migrants.109 Black 
Britons were common by this point in time, but their acceptance in society was not. Many 
black Britons continued to experience racial profiling by businesses, police, and 
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parliamentary legislation, regardless of whether there was a Labour or Conservative 
government.110 Historian Kennetta Hammond Perry has examined the issue of British 
identity for Black Britons arriving from commonwealth territories and former colonies of 
the British Empire. Her argument that British racism was structural as well as societal is 
relevant to football as well, and the transition to safer footballing spaces and the 
promotion of anti-racist ideals in the Premier League era was a reflection of the changing 
structures in British society. There was a strong presence of far-right and neo-Nazi 
groups such as the British National Front in the 1970s and 1980s, an issue that became 
necessary for anti-racist groups to address and stamp out. Certain groups of fans saw 
violence in football as inherently tied to racism, and took matters into their own hands in 
place of a passive police force. Football did not solve its problems of racism, let alone 
racism in society, but the Premier League and its clubs demonstrated that they valued the 
protection of their  players to a much greater level than was the case just a few years 
prior, and black and foreign footballers continued a steady emergence in the English 
game. 
A significant reason that football spaces became prominent arenas for battling 
racism in England was that football grounds proved to be remarkably focused cases of 
racist expression among the predominantly white working-class male fans in the 1970s 
and 1980s. Historian Brett Bebber addressed the complexity of this majority population 
at football grounds, and pointed out that while this was the demographic of the 
perpetrators, it was also the demographic of many of the activists. Anti-racists became 
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more confrontational with racist groups and individuals, encouraged rival fans to speak 
up against racism at their grounds, and demanded more diversity from their clubs in their 
recruitment of players and managers.111 A trend developed too that indicated fans’ desire 
for agency over the situation. Bebber wrote: “Regardless of their level of ease with 
political activism, some supporters defended their right and responsibility to police their 
own terraces and assume the burden of keeping racism outside the game, especially when 
it kept other parties at bay.”112 Bebber’s evidence included clashes between supporters’ 
trusts and clubs over stadium rules policing hate groups, indicating a strong will by anti-
racists to be a part of the solution. An issue with this was fan participation in hostilities 
between groups, something that the government was trying to get rid of at that time. As 
was discussed in the previous chapter, acts of Parliament and spectator policy in the mid-
1980s heightened police control at and around football grounds. With racist and anti-
racist fans clashing, policing hooliganism encompassed both groups, further complicating 
the problem.  
The hostile environments created by hooligans were exacerbated by the presence 
of racist individuals and gangs, and projectiles and Bananas were commonly thrown onto 
the pitch for games in which black players were featured. Emy Onuora, a British scholar 
of race, identity, and sport, has argued that as the population of Britain became more 
diverse, and black footballers in particular became more visible, the racism inherent in 
social arenas such as football became more silenced and/or pushed to the periphery. He 
cited the political activism of a younger generation of Britons and the reaction against 
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Thatcherism in the 1990s. Bebber also notes that the opportunity for activism through 
football was recognized by groups such as the Commission for Racial Equality.113 
Placing football within this context demonstrates the significance of the sport in British 
society and culture, and gives greater meaning to the study of the diversity in the game. 
The arrival of a more diverse pool of footballers and managers was vital to the growth of 
the Premier League and the establishment of its reputation as a premier sporting 
spectacle.  
The racism in this new era of the game was being ushered out at a rate similar to 
the rate that black players, whether foreign or British, were ushered into the professional 
ranks of the English game. Ian Wright, one of the first black English superstars of the 
game, made his name at Crystal Palace before joining reigning First Division champions 
Arsenal in 1991, a year before the Premier League’s formation. He was sensational there, 
and in just seven seasons became the club’s all-time leading goal-scorer, helping the club 
to a Premier League and FA Cup double in 1998 under new manager Arsene Wenger. 
Wright and Wenger didn’t spend much time together, as Wright left the club soon after, 
but both made an important impact in regards to black and foreign presence in the 
English game. Arsenal grew complacent under Scottish manager George Graham, and a 
bold decision was made to bring in Wenger. Wenger, a French manager who had been 
managing in the Japanese top league was dubbed a “graduate of the global game” by 
Glenn Moore of The Independent, who noted the time “might be right” for a foreign 
manager given the opening of minds in the English game.114  
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The new boss introduced a new style to the game, and competed with British 
managers by mixing tough, physical play with elegant attacking flair. The 4-4-2 
formation, a favorite of Wenger in his time at Arsenal, crowded the midfield with 
intelligent hybrid wingers playing behind playmaking forwards that liked to get involved 
in buildup play. English football was guilty throughout its history of being relatively 
closed-minded, and opening it up to new ideas was difficult to accomplish. Jonathan 
Wilson, an expert on the history of the development and sharing of football tactics, labels 
English football as “pragmatic,” and demonstrates well how English teams responded 
when they realized they needed to change their style of play in order to compete at a high 
level internationally.115 The Premier League era was one such era in England, and the 
dominance of Manchester United domestically indicated other clubs’ styles needed 
tinkering, and the hybridization of the English game with foreign tactics began.   
Wenger spent heavily adding foreign players to a mostly English squad at 
Arsenal. The introduction of so many new players brought the risk of angering players 
that preceded him at the club, but he managed the balance well. The diversity of the 
squad worked perfectly in his hybrid tactical setup, pairing physical defending with bold 
and beautiful attacking movements. He was careful to not upset the existing squad, giving 
them fair competition for places and getting the best out of a group that had 
underachieved in the Premier League to that point.116  
Wenger’s arrival was met with some heavy criticism, and players and fans alike 
were unsure of the hire as a replacement to the once highly successful George Graham. 
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Club captain Tony Adams recalled wondering whether he could even speak English, and 
said to have thought “what does this Frenchman know about football?”117 Even in 
hindsight, Adams’ comments reflecting on his skepticism revealed a close-mindedness by 
English players in regard to foreigners. Despite possessing a well-traveled experience in 
management, Wenger was still reduced to his being not English by his own players. 
Wenger was at first unpopular with the Arsenal squad too because of his distaste for the 
English drinking culture. He limited how much players could drink, banned drinking in 
the players lounge, which caught the attention and scrutiny of tabloid media, but 
improved performances nonetheless.118 Wenger soon proved doubters wrong, winning 
the Premier League and FA Cup Double in just his second season in 1997/98, again in 
2002, and winning the Premier League in 2003/04 with an unbeaten league record, a feat 
that hadn’t been achieved in the English top tier since Preston North End accomplished it 
in the 1888/89 season. Though Arsenal didn’t match the dominance and longevity of Sir 
Alex Ferguson’s Manchester United, they were proof that new styles and players could 
successfully mold the English game, and do so without abandoning popular principles of 
the English game. “Globalization is blurring national styles,” Jonathan Wilson wrote in 
his book Inverting the Pyramid, “but tradition, perpetuated by coaches, players, pundits, 
and fans, is strong enough that styles remain distinguishable.”119 This can be used to 
describe the Premier League as well. Wenger and many foreign managers that came to 
the Premier League after him found success by blending tactics, and more importantly 
 
117 Jeremy Wilson, "Arsenal players hail Arsène Wenger as he becomes club's longest-serving 
manager". The Daily Telegraph, October 1, 2009.  
118 Ray Ryan, "Wenger's booze ban!". News of the World, September 29, 1996. 80. 
119 Wilson, Inverting the Pyramid, xxi.   
 
66 
integrating themselves, their methods, and their culture into English clubs. Simply put, 
the top teams from then on required diversity in tactics to achieve success in England and 
in Europe. New managers and new players from around the world helped improve the 
Premier League product and its global marketability.  
There were a few issues as well when it came to policing high profile players who 
, and even Kick It Out, the Premier League’s oldest anti-racism group, bore criticism for 
inaction and austerity in some high profile cases. Kick It Out, born of the Premier 
League’s “Let’s Kick Racism Out of Football” campaign started in 1993, evolved into 
one of the most expansive and supported anti-racism projects in Britain. The organization 
was government backed, as well as supported by the FA and the PFA. It is a leading force 
in the Football Against Racism in Europe organization, and earned official backing by 
UEFA as well. However, despite the broad support for Kick It Out, there were notable 
criticisms akin to those against the governing bodies of football in England. There was 
perceived inaction when it came to punishing racist abuse by high profile players, which 
hindered the organization's public image. Two primary incidents in question were John 
Terry’s alleged racist remarks directed at QPR defender Anton Ferdinand and Luis 
Suarez’s racist remarks directed at Manchester United’s Patrice Evra, both occurring in 
the 2011/12 season. The FA did not punish Terry after an investigation into the incident, 
and the response from Ferdinand and QPR supporters was furious, especially after Luis 
Suarez was punished severely for his case.120 The Liverpool forward was banned for 
eight matches and fined £40,000, which prompted a similarly controversial protest 
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movement by Liverpool supporters and players, and even the manufacture of apparel 
showing support for Suarez.121 Manchester United star defender Rio Ferdinand, Anton’s 
brother, retired from the England national team over the incident, and refused to continue 
supporting Kick It Out campaigns because of the organization's lack of action against 
Terry.122 At the time of doing so Ferdinand was the starting centre back alongside Terry 
in the England squad, and left the team just ahead of England’s trip to the UEFA 
European Championships. The decision by England and the FA to do nothing at a 
seemingly pivotal moment is emblematic of the frustrations that Ferdinand and many 
other black footballers felt with English footballing institutions. Both the defence of 
Suarez by Liverpool players and fans and the inaction against Terry by the FA and 
Chelsea symbolized the austerity that diluted anti-racist messages despite the 
diversification of the game.   
These incidents show that money and diversification clearly did not completely 
solve problems of racism at the bigger clubs, and Chelsea Football Club were an 
excellent example. They were one of many clubs with a reputation for racist supporters at 
their ground of Stamford Bridge, and though the problem was addressed to a degree 
inside the ground problems persisted from the club’s fanbase. Damon Albarn, frontman 
for music groups Blur and Gorillaz, and one of Chelsea’s more famous fans, first 
attempted to get more into the sport at the start of the Premier League era, but he and his 
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bandmates were reportedly turned off by the aggressive racism of other Chelsea 
supporters at the ground.123 As Chelsea emerged as a more competitive side in the 1990s 
and 2000s they became more visible, as did the ugly side of their fanbase. Despite 
Chelsea’s transformation into one of the most prominent clubs in football, winning the 
Premier League and Champions League with a diverse squad of African, Asian, 
European, and South American players, the fanbase had long been unwelcoming to say 
the least when it comes to black players.124 Even Avram Grant, one of Chelsea’s many 
managers in the Premier League era, was subject to anti-semitic abuse from his club’s 
own supporters in online forums.125 Grant, a descendant of Holocaust survivors, was also 
mailed a powder substance at the Chelsea training ground. The continuous abuse from the 
small portion of the fanbase did not last, as Grant was sacked in 2008 and moved to 
another club, but is indicative of the level of commitment that racist fans still had to 
harassing and intimidating individuals in the twenty-first century. Chelsea was the subject 
of an FA investigation for racist acts by fans as recently as 2019, after an incident of 
abuse directed at black Manchester City and England player Raheem Sterling was caught 
on video.126 Sterling was the subject of racist abuse and intense media scrutiny because of 
a tattoo honoring his father.127 The tattoo depicts a rifle, as his father was shot and killed 
in Jamaica when Sterling was young. The abuse prompted a swift response and 
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condemnations from the FA, Premier League, and Chelsea, as well as a life ban from 
Stamford Bridge for the perpetrator.128 Condemnations and life bans for racist abuse 
became the standard in the Premier League. This was a welcome change to the police 
protected far-right displays of the 1970s and 1980s, but showed the limitations of 
policing football spaces as abuse continued its evolution into online forms.  
There was clear value for the Premier League clubs to create safer football 
environments, rooted in the interest of commercial and footballing success. Globalization 
and multiculturalism took off as concepts at big clubs like Arsenal because of the 
attraction foreign players and managers brought when integrated into the English game. 
A league that for a century fielded almost entirely British or Irish players suddenly had 
the financial structures and resources to fund moves for players of all nationalities. This 
was especially relevant to clubs competing with Manchester United at the top. In his 
article “Soccer Goes Glocal” sociologist Richard Giulanotti observed in the early 2000s 
the cultural changes within clubs themselves, bringing in foreign managers with different 
tactical philosophies, but also changing dietary and training expectations.129 Like Wenger 
did at Arsenal, clubs around the Premier League ended traditional English drinking 
culture within their squads and improved player conditioning based on foreign diet and 
training methods.  
Because of its high social visibility, football played an important role in 
highlighting the excesses of British racism in a public forum for all to see.130 Onuora’s 
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analysis focuses on England specifically, but in the Premier League era the issue of 
English racism was then a part of an increasingly multicultural realm. As such a constant 
element of the nation’s most beloved sport, racism could no longer be ignored by British 
society. The result was a uniform and widespread response from clubs and the governing 
bodies in an effort to expel racist abuse from football grounds. Black footballers became 
iconic members of the England national team, and team mainstays like the 
aforementioned Wright, Paul Ince, and Sol Campbell among others helped usher in an era 
in which multiple black players featured in the national side for the first time in its 
history.131 In The Changing Face of Football Sociologists Les Back, Tim Crabbe, and 
John Solomos study the new age of multiculturalism in English football, suggesting that 
the greater integration of football led to solidarity both on and off the pitch. Sharing a 
dressing room was, for Ian Wright, the biggest part of his integration into a 
predominantly white squad at Crystal Palace early in his career. Something as simple as 
exchanging knowledge about care and toiletry products, exchanging banter, and the 
ability to “share our stuff” between teammates helped to create a functional and diverse 
team of players.132 The sort of atmosphere within teams like Crystal Palace and Arsenal 
became more common throughout the 1990s, and inspired closer analysis of the role 
football had in an increasingly more diverse Europe. 
Globalization and multiculturalism, terms used more frequently in the 1990s and 
2000s, were also used in football discourse concerning European leagues and 
competitions. Multiculturalism and football have been a subject of academic discourse 
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since the 1990s, and sociologists and historians alike have taken great interest in the 
complexities of race and national identity in sport. They saw England as an interesting 
case study because of its status as a premier footballing country, a former imperial 
metropole, and a frequent destination for foreign players outside of former colonies and 
imperial holdings. The arrival of migrants from former imperial holdings intensely 
diversified the population of western Europe in the twentieth century, and it has been 
shown that these migration patterns have affected the footballing landscape in these 
metropoles as well.  
Laurent Dubois’ Soccer Empire was not a study of England, but examined a 
similar issue within French football and politics. The primary subjects are Zinedine 
Zidane and Lilian Thuram, children of migrant families and veteran leaders of the French 
National Football Team during their most successful period. They were both raised in 
France and able to claim French nationality, but as they and other children of immigrants 
emerged in the French team they became the subject of racist and islamaphobic abuse and 
criticism from Jean-Marie Le Pen and his burgeoning far-right French National Front 
political party. However, he also argues that the new generation of diverse French 
footballers helped to force public discourse of pressing issues of France’s imperial legacy 
and modern racism and xenophobia, and states that these helped shape the present 
political reality of France.133 Dubois’ analysis of football as an “inescapable” institution 
that is “as real as any government or church” is precisely the framework that defined the 
modern game.134 It was an institution of people, a vessel of publicly shared emotions and 
 
133 Dubois, Laurent, Soccer Empire: The World Cup and the Future of France, University of 
California Press: Berkeley, 2010. 19.   
134 Dubois, Soccer Empire. 21.   
 
72 
values expressed beyond the realm of spectator control that nonetheless captured both 
their financial and personal investment. Its ability to mobilize people made it an 
interesting force for social change in fights against racism and nationalism while also 
bearing the problems and manifestations of such social divisions.  
Another side effect of expanded diversity was the accumulation of talent in the 
Premier League and other European leagues from foreign continents. Players who once 
stayed and played within respective home nations left for Europe with greater regularity 
from the 1990s on. South American, African, and Asian domestic leagues regularly saw 
their top talent emigrate to Western Europe because of the accumulation of capital by 
those leagues and clubs. Economist and Globalization academic Branko Milanovic wrote 
about this phenomenon in the European game, and argued that while it increased the 
quality of football played it also increased economic inequality.135 African countries such 
as Ghana, Nigeria, and Cote D’Ivoire have seen numerous players reach the heights of 
the club game in the 21st century at European clubs, and though their national teams have 
improved as well the commercial benefits have not trickled down equally.136 Even 
traditional footballing powerhouses such as Brazil and Argentina have witnessed their 
internal football infrastructures and club game crumble as their top talent is lured away to 
Europe. Lionel Messi, Argentina’s latest all-time great player, has played his entire club 
career at Barcelona, moving to the country when he was just 13 years old to continue his 
development. When the development and maturation of players in this way is entirely 
relocated to Europe it makes the transfer fee paid to the domestic clubs smaller, and 
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means there are no seasons spent by the player playing professionally in their country of 
origin. This happening with greater regularity means the wealth generated by these 
talents circulate almost entirely within the top European leagues with no one but the 
national team left to prosper in the countries of origin.  
The accumulation of foreign talent in Western Europe was an issue that 
transcended efforts to combat racism at local levels, and was indicative of a looming 
history of Imperialism. As Dubois discussed in Soccer Empire, European nations like 
France had populations that reflected all sorts of diasporas, but naturalized and French-
born citizenship gave many children of migrant families the right to French citizenship. 
When it came to footballers, the national team began to reflect these diasporas.137 The 
wealth of the game accumulated in Europe made it more beneficial for these footballers 
to further their trade in these countries. The issue of financial fairness and the massive 
wealth that European countries accumulated prompted economic solutions in the game, 
which focused on the big clubs such as England’s Big Six. Governing bodies such as 
FIFA and UEFA tried to implement Financial Fair Play regulations to redistribute the 
massive capital amassed by the biggest clubs across Europe as well as prevent 
bankruptcy and overspending at smaller clubs, but these had only a minimal effect. The 
regulations also prompted discussion of a European Super League between the rich clubs 
that required only legacy and mass appeal for qualification, rather than the merit-based 
qualification of league position and cup success for UEFA competitions.138 This 
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increased wealth gap gave these clubs unprecedented leverage over the rest of the game, 
including in some cases their own football communities.  
Anti-Racism In Action 
The reasons for a shift toward more social justice principles are clearer when 
examining the English game, where commercial interests in the Premier League era 
coincided with international marketability and the increased protection of black and 
foreign players. Historian Brett Bebber argued this in Violence and Racism in football, 
suggesting that both the Tory and Labour parties maintained an interest in quelling 
spectator violence for the sake of expanding economic possibilities within the sport 
industry.139 Many of the Premier League’s diverse cast of superstars welcomed their 
visibility and embraced tough, rebel-like personae. Though the commercial motivation 
meant glossing over certain problems with racism in football and society, the Premier 
League made England an unavoidably diverse football environment. 
Football was always a sport driven by its intense and loyal fanbases and the 
communities built around them, but as was explored in the previous chapter there was a 
considerable amount of hostility generated between those communities. Though 
hooliganism was on the decline by the mid-1990s the issue of fan behavior towards 
players and inside and outside of stadiums continued to be a problem in English football. 
A 2020 study by football anti-racism organization and Premier League partner group 
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Kick It Out indicated that 43% of Premier League players surveyed were victims of 
targeted abuse.140 The study indicated abuse had shifted out of football spaces and 
towards an online setting, but interactions between fans and players at football grounds 
were the first area where fan racism was addressed in the Premier League era. Stadiums 
were once burdened with a toxic atmosphere of chants with slurs, monkey noises, and 
objects thrown towards the pitch. Greater responsibility was taken after the creation of 
the Premier League in identifying abusers and banning them from future matches as well 
as increasing security presence and barriers around the border between the pitch and the 
stands. Efforts to protect players in the Premier League era indicate a general 
understanding of the danger presented by the English fan. This is understandable given 
the context of the early Premier League era, with the game only recently removed from 
the Heysel Stadium Disaster and clashes with police under Thatcher’s government and at 
international competitions. The players themselves were all too aware of the ugliness of 
some supporters, and players felt that Cantona’s kick out at one such fan was perhaps a 
long time coming.   
Cantona’s violent actions in reaction to an abusive fan embodied the feelings that 
many players harbored, particularly against hooligans who made the matchday about 
themselves by inciting conflict with police, stadium officials, players, or other hooligans 
and troublemakers. In Rob Smyth’s brief history of the incident, written for The 
Guardian, he cited evidence of widespread, albeit private, support for Cantona among 
other Premier League players. Arsenal striker Ian Wright, who experienced racist abuse 
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from fans throughout his career, was reportedly “jealous” of Cantona. Even TV presenter 
Nick Hancock, an “Anyone but United” hard-man, claimed it was “comfortably the best 
thing that’s happened this season.”141 This narrative juxtaposed a sensationalist response 
in tabloids, often sources of racist and xenophobic discourse themselves. The Daily 
Mirror headline read: “The Shame of Cantona: Is this the end for the madman?”142  
However, other press outlets, such as  The Independent came to Cantona’s 
defense as well. Days after the incident, amid a storm of sensational tabloid pieces and 
outrageous eye-catching headlines, reporter Richard Williams wrote, somewhat in jest, 
that Cantona’s only fault was to stop his attack on Simmons.143 The press was clearly 
more divided on the issue, but the more thoughtful approaches of journalists such as 
Williams more reflected the feelings of players in regard to hooligans. The “jealousy” of 
Ian Wright reflected the frustrations players had with supporters like Simmons, and 
following the incident it was revealed why. As part of the furore, more about Simmons’ 
own character was investigated. Simmons was revealed to have been a known agitator as 
a football spectator, and had some ties to neo-Nazi British nationalist groups.144 He and 
many other football fans throughout the country directed abuse freely at players, 
something that at the time was seen as a test of will for professionals who wanted to 
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perform at the highest level in England. It was later recognized for its potential dangers to 
players and fans alike, but the issue of combating fan conflict is one which the football 
world was historically insufficient in dealing with. Though there was no way Cantona 
could have known his soon to be victim was cut from such despicable cloth, the 
assumption of racism and xenophobia from English fans was a pretty safe one from 
footballers. This is largely because for a long time far-right, actively racist and hostile 
groups were allowed to participate in football grounds by police while anti-racist and 
anti-fascist groups were.145 The presence of these groups expanded crowd hostility to a 
level that was less acceptable in the Premier League era, and that is where the issue of 
safety in football spaces turned next. Governing bodies, the Premier League, clubs, 
players, and activists struggled to stay on the same page in the campaigns against racism, 
but for the most part football grounds were cleansed of far-right organizations acting 
openly, an effort aided by the incidents that shed light on them.  
Cantona’s intolerance of the abuse raised a new question about where exactly the 
line that should not be crossed is in regards to supporters and player abuse. As football 
journalist and Cantona biographer Phillippe Auclair pointed out, it was quite lucky for 
Cantona that Simmons wound up being an abhorrent person with a criminal record for 
assaulting immigrants, as it was Cantona’s own decision to leap over the barrier and 
attack the fan spouting abuse.146 Indeed, Simmons’ far-right background gave the 
incident’s legacy a different spin. Rather than being remembered for its ugliness the kick 
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actually generated some legacy of heroism for Cantona. Smyth’s piece for The Guardian 
demonstrates this well: 
“The act Cantona perpetrated at Selhurst Park might have been his most 
worthwhile of all. It was the most important moment in a relationship between 
players and fans so enduring and spiritual as to be almost without comparison. He 
was already a United legend. On 25 January 1995, he became immortal.”147 
 
Smyth’s account reflects well the role the incident had in Cantona’s legacy, and for 
United fans in particular his attack against Simmons specifically was celebrated. One 
Manchester United fanzine co-opted the image of Cantona kicking Simmons with a 
“Let’s kick racism out of football” tag, with special emphasis on the word “kick.”148 This 
was one of several instances of solidarity from Manchester United fans for Cantona, who 
was wholeheartedly embraced. His French heritage was incorporated into imagery on 
flags and scarves, and their “Ooh Aah Cantona” chant utilized the tune of La 
Marseillaise.149 Though this was not universally the case for foreign players, the embrace 
of Cantona by United supporters after the incident especially was telling of the respect 
that a powerful personality could command in the English game. The show of support by 
Manchester United fans similarly shows a level of commitment to protecting a foreign 
player that likely would not have occurred in the 1980s. It is significant that Cantona both 
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survived the controversy and received support at all given the xenophobic hostility 
present in the game just a few years earlier.  
Intolerance of abuse was evident at other clubs as well, a trend that developed in 
response to the fact that certain club grounds and stadiums became specifically notorious 
for racist abuse. Certain clubs developed reputations for the uncontrolled racist behavior 
of their fanbase, notably Chelsea, Leeds United, West Ham United, Newcastle United, 
and Millwall, and these expressions manifested in play as well in the form of racist 
remarks, body checks, and unnecessarily aggressive challenges.150 In this way, the 
identity of the club appeared to have taken on an element of racism, expressed in songs 
and chants, in abuse directed at players, in criticisms of players, in hate mail, and by the 
club’s players on the pitch. Racism was absolutely not exclusive to specific clubs, but 
there were clubs whose identity fostered and maintained racism as part of its identity that 
remains even in the present. It took the action of anti-racist groups of supporters to begin 
the cleanup, as outside authorities provided little by way of assistance in preventing far-
right racist groups of supporters from organizing and causing trouble at football 
matches.151   
In the 1980s a group of anti-racist and anti-fascist Leeds United supporters took 
action against the presence of far-right neo-Nazis, which had increased to a frightening 
level in the late 1970s. Initially the local police were hostile towards the anti-racists, 
claiming that their presence would lead to violence at Leeds’ Elland Road stadium.152 
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The group eventually helped ban the far-right groups and Nazi imagery from Elland Road 
stadium through publication of a report that documented numerous cases of violence by 
these groups in the community and outside football grounds.153 The group, named “Leeds 
Fans United Against Racism and Facism,” produced a dossier of evidence of racist 
violence on part of neo-Nazi groups gathered largely from local newspaper clippings.154 
Despite the opposition this group of supporters received from local police, they were 
effective in lobbying for change within the club. The report exposed these groups to the 
public eye more than ever, and the club ownership group responded by banning these 
groups and individual members from the ground. Through these efforts, Elland Road’s 
national reputation as an openly hostile ground for black footballers started to change.  
Despite the success of efforts by fan activists and the government to combat fan 
violence, the Cantona incident was also emblematic of the survival of aggressive 
xenophobic fan behavior outside of a more organized form. For all the progress that had 
been made in English Football coming out of the 1980s, Richard Williams argued that the 
true nature of the fan had not yet changed. “It isn't funny or charming, or even traditional. 
It's the distilled essence of hatred,” Williams wrote of crowd hissing and jeering, “and a 
reminder that the existence of all-seater grandstands with decent lavatories doesn't 
guarantee a mass conversion to the higher emotions.”155 Football supporters had come a 
long way from the violence and disorder of previous decades, but their behavior was still 
in many ways a hindrance to the game. Football spaces became cleaner and more 
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comfortable for the fan experience than ever before in the top flight, and racism in 
football was largely pushed into new spaces of expression.  
The endurance of Cantona throughout the controversy also indicated that players 
that endured abuse with a certain edginess and attitude, could be quite likeable and 
marketable in the Premier League era. It was a badge of honor for some, and would 
further endear them to members of their increasingly global audience. Nike, a booming 
American sporting apparel brand because of black basketball superstar Michael Jordan’s 
celebrity in the 1990s, decided to capitalize on the character of Cantona and Ian Wright. 
Nike took a bolder, open minded approach to its marketing in Europe by embracing 
characters that might have been deemed too controversial, and started in England with 
Wright and Cantona. For Ian Wright, Nike embraced the arrogance of a goalscorer, 
putting him on billboards with a sly slogan that read: “Behind every great goalkeeper 
there’s a ball from Ian Wright.”156 One similar advert with Cantona quipped: “66 was a 
great year for English football. . . Eric was born.”157 With 1966 being the year of 
England’s only World Cup victory, and the only World Cup hosted on English soil, this 
slogan embraced the potential controversy with its message. The media swarm around 
Cantona post-Kung Fu kick brought some negativity to the Frenchman’s reputation, but 
also fueled the interest in him. Both Cantona and Wright embraced the hate they 
received, and for Cantona in particular it became a specific part in his legend. They were 
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players with reputations as rebels, Cantona especially, and their embrace of this persona 
empowered their legacy as enigmatic celebrities.  
Cantona never hid his remarkable personality from the public eye, and even a 
moment in which he detested the attention of the press, he quipped what became a 
timeless quote in sport. His press conference following the incident became legendary in 
its own right as he both attacked and embraced the obsession with a short but 
philosophical statement: “When the seagulls. . . follow the trawler. . . It is because they 
think sardines will be thrown into the sea. Thank you.”158 The media, or the seagulls, 
were predictably unsatisfied, but the villain label was no longer what it used to be. 
Controversy had its own appeal, as did the edge and attitude towards aggressive fans that 
Cantona and Wright both expressed. The xenophobia present in the attacks directed at 
foreign players was still very much a part of the English game, but the ugliness of it was 
much more of a turn off than it would have been considered before. The reality now was 
that non-white players were becoming fan favorites, and the draw of the Premier League 
only increased overseas. The appreciation of greatness and the new and exciting talent 
that the Premier League drew in produced a football spectacle the likes of which English 
fans had never seen before, and the market continued to respond. By promoting and 
sponsoring these players, enlisting them in adverts, and embracing their combative 
attitude, companies and clubs bet on profits that consciousness in the game had shifted, 
and were proven to be right. It should be noted however, that the main motivation in this 
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was profit, and the explicit connection between anti-racism and marketing made money 
an undeniable factor in this sort of activism.  
Foreign and black players endeared themselves to fanbases, but there emerged 
interesting issues of racism in the form of well-intentioned slur use in songs as a show of 
affection. Sociologists studied this subject as English football in the context of English 
nationalism, arguing that forms of casual racism were thrown about often as a way of 
taunting and reducing people to their identity and/or culture, including foreigners, black 
players and fans, and even regional groups within England.159 Rivalries between cities 
and towns manifested in matches between clubs upped the volume on ugly chants and 
abuse, showing the tribalism that still existed between communities within England let 
alone foreign groups in the 1990s.160 The tribalism between clubs remained, but as was 
shown in the previous chapter the level of hooliganism, rioting, and supporter conflict 
had declined dramatically since the 1980s.161 As black players became more visible than 
ever in the Premier League era the intersection between sport, money, and identity 
became more and more complex. This was the flip side of anti-racist ad campaigns, 
resulting in a somewhat vague message about racism. One Nike billboard featuring black 
England striker Les Ferdinand alongside Cantona read: “What do you see? A black man, 
a Frenchman, or a footballer? Why argue about the differences? I’d rather just play 
football.”162 This commodification of the issue at hand accomplished very little in regard 
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to racism, and in a way suggested that just shutting up and playing the sport was the 
point. The intention was there, portraying a black and a foreign player together in 
defiance of racism, but the slogan said more about selling the sport than it did about the 
meaning of putting those players together. 
Sociologist Adam Brown published an article alongside other football sociologists 
Tim Crabbe and Gavin Mellor concerning the observed role of football clubs in 
community and social issues. They argued that in the 1990s a shift began within clubs 
towards greater community involvement and advancement of social issues.163 Racism in 
particular became a widely discussed issue in the football community at the time, and 
groups such as Kick It Out and the Premier League’s own anti-racism campaigns were 
unanimously supported by clubs. It is a show of solidarity not only with the increasingly 
diverse and global supporters’ communities, but also a defense of footballers themselves. 
The article describes the recognition of “ambivalence” and its effect on “marketing and 
regeneration through the aesthetic of football.”164 It is interesting to see football analyzed 
this way, as a capitalist enterprise taking public stances on social issues. In fact, it was 
something which club sponsors were increasingly insistent on, which again indicates the 
financial motivation evident in decision-making for football clubs. They concluded that a 
thorough “re-imagining of the football and community issue” was required in the modern 
age of their increasingly more political existence as communal entities.165 The article was 
written in 2006 as the relationship between fans and clubs became increasingly reduced 
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at the management level, with owners taking a more active role in running the club as a 
business without the input of supporters' trusts. The idea of community is important in 
football, and maintenance of that communal relationship with fans has been a priority for 
clubs from a public relations perspective, but actions do not always indicate that has been 
the case in other areas. The anti-racism social movements over the years varied in 
success, and it appeared that the involvement of clubs helped to reduce racism in football 
atmospheres. Kick It Out shifted its focus to the persistent problem outside of football 
grounds, where the authority of the leagues, clubs, and even the police was ineffective.166  
But while racism at football grounds quieted, the digital age offered a new and 
more complicated platform for abuse: the internet. Football clubs and fan communities 
took full advantage of the new medium for communication. Fan blogs and message 
boards were set up as an evolution of fanzines, and were accessible to a much wider 
audience across the globe. Social media contributed to this as well, with Facebook groups 
and Twitter communities linked together on platforms for largely uncensored expression 
of opinions, ideas, and takes. Racism and censorship of it became less personal in online 
forums, and though it was removed from actual football spaces the conversation has since 
shifted to how cyber targeting of players can be combated successfully. A study of racism 
in online football forums uncovered a litany of racist and islamaphobic comments about 
players posted and left unedited and unremoved.167 Kick it Out representatives endorsed 
increased methods of tracing online accounts to persons hiding behind them, and there 
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have been cases of people being tracked down and charged for racist abuse on these 
platforms, but when actual persons behind accounts reside overseas it’s impossible to 
track down and charge them without the cooperation of multiple law enforcement 
agencies and social media companies across the world.168 The inaction of internet 
companies to reveal the identity and information of users comes with its own 
enforcement problems and moral questions about internet privacy, but it became a central 
issue to combating racism on new age platforms.169  
This fits the narrative of academics of the subject, who showed that racism in 
football spaces adapted to live outside of the spotlight. In Pitch Black, Onuora argued that 
there was significant improvement in the attitude of English crowds towards black 
players in the decades between the breakthrough of black players in the first division in 
the 1970s and the regularity of black English and foreign players in the Premier League 
in the 21st century.170 Overt racism was largely removed from English football grounds, 
and the Premier League era of money brought greater wealth to both the development of 
black English players and the investment in foreign talent.171 Italy and Spain had 
previously dominated the market for foreign players because of the money that it offered, 
but the economic growth of the Premier League and heightened level of play among its 
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top clubs made England the desired destination for many international stars of the game. 
Players like Dennis Bergkamp, David Ginola, and Thierry Henry among many others 
arrived from top European sides in favor of playing for Premier League challengers. 
The Premier League maintained a strong anti-racism stance, but as was often the 
case the manifestation of that policy through action was complicated by authority, crowd 
policing methods, and the role of clubs and supporters groups in combating racist acts. 
However, the behavior of players experiencing abuse from fans changed dramatically, 
from hesitant to bold, and in many cases those players became outspoken activists 
promoting social movements against racism. Cantona and Wright were not unique cases 
of players adding an edge to their off-the pitch personalities, and brands like Nike 
continued to consciously sign athletes who push social justice narratives. Black England 
stars Marcus Rashford and Jadon Sancho, vocal proponents of the Black Lives Matter 
movement, are both poster boys for Nike’s football/soccer brands, signed in tandem as 
opposed to the normal Nike method of signing multiple players to shoe and apparel 
deals.172 As they did with American athletes LeBron James and Colin Kaepernick in the 
United States, Nike looked overseas for athletes that are active and vocal in social justice 
and politics. The call for such personalities unfortunately continued, but does so with 
support from clubs and the Premier League in message more so than action. There was 
obvious support for anti-racism campaigns from a public relations and economic point of 
view because of the violence and hooliganism embedded in the racism that many 
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supporters’ groups brought to the game, and the added incentive of protecting minority 
and foreign players from abuse led to an expansion of anti-racism efforts.  
The Premier League was an accessible product across the world, and long 
maintained an anti-racist message as part of its inclusivity. Partnerships with Kick It Out, 
and campaigns such as No Room For Racism were well-funded and publicized projects, 
but there were still problems which persisted into the twenty-first century.173 The 
multicultural transformation of the Premier League era clearly aided in the fight against 
racism in English football, and the Premier League created extensive policy and 
procedure for reporting racism in football grounds and on the internet.174 The push 
towards more accessible and safe environments at football grounds helped turn English 
football into a diverse, hybrid game which featured some of the brightest minds in the 
sport from around the world. Top foreign players were brought into the league at higher 
rates than ever before, black English players were regulars for clubs as well as the 
England national team, and racism in all its forms decreased at football grounds. The 
decrease in volume of football-related arrests over time indicated better behavior on the 
part of fans as well, even with incidents such as Cantona’s.175 Xenophobic sentiments 
never fully went away however, and the decrease in incidents within football grounds did 
not translate to the removal of racism and xenophobia entirely. Premier League teams 
enhanced their football with more diverse squad and coaching staffs going into the 
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twenty-first century, and abuse continued as well despite its weakened and dispersed 
voice.  
Conclusion 
There was a lot of animosity within football, whether it be part of the actual game 
or not, and it boiled over in new ways in the Premier League era. In order to continue 
creating a marketable product the Premier League adapted in many ways to create safer 
environments for its players and fans, and pushed out some very real and ugly parts of 
English society in the process. An influx of foreign talent and the emergence of a talented 
generation of black Britons forced the league and its clubs to be more active in forcing 
social change and combating racism in football areas. Government legislation, discussed 
in the previous chapter, enforced harsher punishment for egregious hate crimes, but this 
chapter has shown there were also more cultural evolutions of anti-racist campaigning. 
Football partner anti-racist campaigns emerged, social media and online forums became a 
new battleground of racist discourse, and players themselves embraced edginess and 
defiance in the face of xenophobic abuse. The idea of a football community became 
harnessed in a more global fashion, incorporating values of openness as the Premier 
League further marketed itself as a global sporting phenomenon. However, the money 
that drove this unprecedented growth also complicated the relationships within football 
communities across England. Fanbases were vocal about their loss of agency within their 
clubs as foreign investment and consolidated control by owners became more 
commonplace. The next chapter will explore this case specifically, and the way the most 
successful club in Premier League history and its community grappled with an identity 
crisis in the new millennium. 
 
90 
CHAPTER IV – NAME ON THE TROPHY: MANCHESTER UNITED AND THE 
MODERN CLUB 
 “Can Manchester United score, they always score.”176 Clive Tyldsley’s words, 
heard across the world, echoed the reputation that the red half of Manchester had grown 
accustomed to over an already memorable 1998/99 season. They were on the verge of 
winning a historic treble of the Premier League, FA Cup and UEFA Champions League 
titles in the same season, but trailed 1-0 to German champions Bayern Munich in the 
minutes of the UEFA Champions League final. Tyldsley, his co-commentator and former 
Manchester United manager Ron Atkinson, and the rest of the footballing world watched 
on as David Beckham lined up a corner kick for a last ditch comeback effort. Beckham’s 
targets included all ten of his teammates, with the entire defense and goalkeeper forward 
in an effort to equalize. The ball bounced around a chaotic 18-yard box, which contained 
nearly every player on the pitch, before finding its way to Ryan Giggs. He sent in a weak 
shot, which was steered in by Teddy Sheringham. “Name on the trophy!” Tyldsley 
shouted. “Teddy Sheringham, with thirty seconds of added time played, has equalized for 
Manchester United, they are still in the European Cup!”177 
The feeling, as described by a number of players, was that they would now go to 
extra time with the momentum.178 They had trailed from the sixth minute of the game, 
and struggled to find scoring chances with their two key central midfielders missing the 
final through suspension, but Ferguson’s substitutions and instructions had done the job. 
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In typical fashion they won late chances, and were rewarded with an equalizer in the first 
minute of stoppage time. The players prepared themselves for the extra time period of 30 
minutes that would follow if the teams were still level after the full 90 minutes.  
However, after the restart, the ball was pushed up the field quickly again, and 
United’s Norwegian forward Ole Gunnar Solskjaer won a second corner in the final 
minute of stoppage time. Beckham again delivered a bending cross towards the Bayern 
goal, goalscorer Teddy Sheringham gave it a flick on header towards the foot of 
Solskjaer, who smashed it past Bayern goalkeeper Oliver Kahn to give Manchester 
United an unbelievable win at the death.  
“And Solskjaer has won it!,” yelled Tyldsley. “Manchester United have reached the 
promised land!” Tyldsley’s voice indicated both his surprise and perhaps even joy over 
what had unfolded. “Ole Solskjaer. . . the two substitutes have scored the two goals in 
stoppage time, and the treble looms large!”179   
Manchester United’s incredible late comeback win left Bayern Munich stunned, 
and the players could hardly stand back up to kick the ball off again. With such little time 
remaining there wasn’t much point anyway, and the referee soon blew the final whistle, 
meaning that for the first time since 1968 Manchester United were the champions of 
Europe. The club had had a long and emotional relationship with the UEFA Champions 
League, and waited just over thirty years before they won it a second time. A plane crash 
in 1958 saw much of the team tragically lost, but the revival of the club under manager 
Sir Matt Busby, the story of he and Sir Bobby Charlton recovering to lead the team to 
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European glory, and the emergence of another generation of academy players created a 
mythos around the club that laid the foundation for its storied legacy. Like that first 
European victory in 1968, the United squad in 1999 featured numerous academy 
products, players who grew up within the club system and into the first team. The 1999 
side also faced a difficult run of fixtures against Europe’s best on the way to the final, 
being matched against former European champions such as Bayern Munich, FC 
Barcelona, Inter Milan, and Juventus on the way to winning the historic trophy. It was 
emblematic of the difficult journey back to this stage it had been for Manchester United, 
who were relatively absent from the winner’s stage during the 1970s and 1980s. The 
Treble closed out the 1990s in style, and cemented their status as one of the premier 
sporting franchises in the world going into the twenty-first century. The quest for 
European glory was emblematic of the club’s status as one of the most successful clubs in 
English football, but also of the modern commercial interests that made the club one of 
the biggest brands in the world. The club’s history was invaluable in growing their 
fanbase across the globe and, pushing for further success attracted more foreign 
supporters, players, and crucially investors.  
The 1999 Treble was a feat that had never been achieved by any English club 
before, and none replicated it after. It gave an added layer of permanence to the mythos 
that surrounds Manchester United, and cemented their status as the dominant English 
club in the new Premier League era. While the never-say-die attitude and aura of the club 
certainly seemed to have been a part of their remarkable success in the 1990s, there is 
also a practical explanation for the club’s conquest of the English game in this time. 
Manchester United were an exceptional success in the English game because of their 
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ability to capitalize on the opportunity of the Premier League era both on and off the 
pitch. The football mastery of the manager and players, the financial backing of the club, 
and the economic sustainability that football success brought in the 1990s helped turn the 
club into a global sporting superpower. United’s riches made them well equipped to 
ascend to the top of the English game and become a global brand in the Premier League 
era of immense revenue. This is not to say that they were guaranteed the level of success 
that they achieved commercially or in football, but the opportunity came at a time when 
the club was ready to compete at a high level. However, that success attracted outside 
interest in the club, and a change in ownership upset an already teetering balance of 
power within the club that would exacerbate matters when the safety net of football 
mastery was removed. A forced takeover by American billionaire Malcolm Glazer 
angered supporters by stripping them of their small but influential stake in the club, and 
ushered in financially focused decision-makers with little knowledge of the sport.  
The takeover highlighted a common issue among English fans, dealing with club 
owners whose primary interest was profiting from the club. There was an increased 
feeling of disconnect between the club and its local community, and the line between 
artificiality and genuineness became increasingly blurred when it came to club- 
sponsored content. The new owners divided the Manchester United fanbase with their 
approach to club management, and the criticisms of their lack of investment in the team 
was legitimized by a dip in form. Sir Alex Ferguson was a legendary figure at the club for 
a reason, and upon his retirement the club’s footballing infrastructure collapsed. Multiple 
managers tried and failed to influence change under the Glazer ownership, but an answer 
presented itself in the form of a familiar face. They experimented with putting a former 
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club legend on the pitch in the manager’s role, and realized a personification of the 
culture of nostalgia and legacy that was perpetuated in club media. 
Though there is brief discussion of other clubs and forms of Premier League club 
ownership in this chapter, Manchester United is the primary focus because of its iconic 
status in the English game. I argue that Manchester United epitomized the Premier 
League era in multiple regards, growing as a global entity as it maintained success, 
accumulated wealth, and featured ongoing disputes between its supporters and ownership 
over issues of club culture, funding, and community representation. Furthermore, the 
club’s unique approach to branding and self-actualization demonstrated the goals of the 
modern football club. Manchester United went to great efforts to preserve and promotes 
its history and reputation as one of the biggest sporting clubs in the world, even when 
results on the pitch began to indicate otherwise.  
Manchester United and Relationships between Clubs and Supporters in the Premier 
League Era  
There were several reasons for Manchester United’s storied rise on and off the 
pitch. First and foremost, Manchester United were a well-run football club under the 
management of Sir Alex Ferguson. After his appointment in 1986 Ferguson “tripled” the 
scouting system at Manchester United, placing a particular focus on the Greater 
Manchester area as to secure the future services of the brightest young Mancunin 
talents.180 In addition to this, the club was smarter about transfers than it had been before 
Ferguson. Club owner and Chairman Martin Edwards notably splurged on players and 
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club expenses in the 1970s and 1980s while consolidating his ownership of the club. He 
became a bit more conservative in order to recoup his losses, but gave greater trust to 
Ferguson in regards to negotiating for and bringing in new players. The result was 
resounding success on the pitch, which made the club a desirable destination for some of 
the top players in the game.  
Another factor in Manchester United’s emergence was money. As was discussed 
in the first chapter, owner and club chairman Martin Edwards was one of the leaders in 
the formation of the Premier League, teaming up with chairman and board members from 
other big clubs in an effort to create a new elite tier of the English league system that was 
controlled by the clubs themselves. The money that the Premier League brought in from 
television was a substantial boost to clubs, and with Manchester United winning the 
Premier League title in each of the competition’s first two seasons, they were also 
eligible for qualification to European competition, further boosting the club’s 
international presence and revenue. Television revenue from the Premier League alone 
increased from £62 million to £357 million between 1995 and 2000, and finishing at or 
near the top of the table each season gave United a large share of profits in that time.181 
Stefan Szymanski, author of Soccernomics, noted their ability to spend while expanding 
their revenue in the 1990s, which made them an exception to a long held trend of clubs 
needing to take a loss on revenue in order to get better.182 TV money from domestic and 
European competitions and the marketing of club memorabilia and merchandise through 
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global apparel brands gave them the financial riches to pair with their footballing riches, 
which built a sense of invincibility and inevitably about the club.  
Martin Edwards’s family had owned Manchester United since the 1960s, and 
though his investment in the club came at a considerable personal cost it paid dividends 
for himself and the club with the arrival of success in the Premier League era. Edwards 
stood his ground against potential takeovers in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and after 
supporting the formation of the Premier League was able to further fund squad moves to 
build on Ferguson’s success.183 It was a case of the rich getting richer for Manchester 
United, and the club responded by reinvesting the money into the squad. They offered 
higher wages and unprecedented transfer fees on top of the appeal of playing for a team 
that dominated the English game. Because of this, they were able to secure the services of 
top players from league rivals. Roy Keane from Nottingham Forest, Andy Cole from 
Newcastle United, Teddy Sheringham from Tottenham Hotspur, and Dwight Yorke from 
Aston Villa were four notable transfers who came from teams that were challenging 
Manchester United for trophies and they still sold to United anyway. They broke the 
British transfer fee record three times in the first decade of the Premier League, including 
twice in the span of one year.184 This was indicative of the financial power and influence 
that the club had created for itself over the English game. However, the model of 
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ownership from Edwards was not total, and he still answered to other shareholders and a 
supporters’ trust of minority fan owners. The club was still considerably richer than its 
peers in the Premier League, but maintained a very real economic connection to its 
football community. 
Lastly, Manchester United’s emergence in the 1990s can be largely attributed to 
its ambition as a company to promote and expand its brand across the globe. As the club 
achieved greater heights in the 1990s than ever before, their reach and influence was once 
again reinforced by a reputation of success and entertaining football. The club were 
conscious of this, as well as the draw of their history as one of the greatest clubs in 
football, and set about capitalizing on their popularity commercially. Their brand drew in 
more and more club sponsorship deals, and they entertained bidding wars from 
manufacturers like Nike, Adidas, and Umbro for the right to produce their official kit and 
club apparel. In 2002 a deal signed with Nike was valued at £24 million annually.185 Club 
revenue was reaching unprecedented heights, and projections for the increase of TV 
revenue indicated that their profitability would continue to grow.  
At the turn of the twenty-first century Manchester United were more than just a 
successful football club, they were a successful business. This drew the attention of 
Rupert Murdoch and BSkyB, the same company that built much of its success off of the 
landmark Premier League broadcasting deal.186 Murdoch was now interested in 
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purchasing a majority ownership of the club. If not for government intervention over 
monopoly concerns a deal may have been reached with the club shareholders, but it was 
indicative of both external interest in acquiring the club and the possible interest of 
majority shareholder Martin Edwards in finding a buyer.187 Edwards and his father had 
owned the club since the 1960s, but as he began to cut corners for his own personal gain 
he had soured his relationship with fans. He tried several times to flip the club for lump 
profit, and angered fans in general for his profit incentive, even being quoted as saying 
that smaller clubs were a drain on the sport and should be “put to sleep” for the sake of 
the game.188 As Edwards began selling off his shares of the club, Ferguson became the 
most senior figure at Old Trafford. As the manager’s own legend grew, so did his 
influence and leadership over the future of the club. 
The club eventually found a buyer in American billionaire Malcolm Glazer. 
Glazer and his family investment group first ventured into professional sports with the 
purchase of the Tampa Bay Buccaneers of the NFL, and decided to move into European 
football with Manchester United in 2003, fresh off of a Super Bowl win in American 
football.189 Starting with just a 2% stake in 2003, Glazer slowly bought out more and 
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more small shareholders of the club until he owned 30% of the club in late 2004, just a 
year and a half after his first purchase.190 Glazer’s investment was not a secret, and each 
of his acquisitions was reported in the press, but there was not much fuss made by 
supporters until his big move to acquire a controlling ownership of the club.  
In 2005 Glazer purchased a major chunk of Manchester United from Irish 
investment duo JP McManus and John Magnier, adding nearly 29% of the club’s shares. 
This gave the Glazers the controlling stake they needed to complete a forceful buyout of 
remaining minority shareholders, take the club off the stock market, and secure a total 
controlling ownership of the club.191 By 2006 he was the undisputed owner of the club, 
placing his sons Joel and Avram in charge of operations. The move was even more 
stunning and nefarious for fans when they realized that despite the financial prowess of 
the Glazers the club was to be used to absorb the massive debt from the loans the Glazers 
took out to complete the takeover.192 The large share owned by McManus and Magnier 
was the last hope for many fans who wanted the club to stay out of Glazer’s control, and 
the circumstances which led to the buyout made it all more frustrating. McManus and 
Magnier were brought in partially because of their relationship with Ferguson, indicating 
that he would keep influence over the board. This relationship extended into horse racing, 
but when an ownership dispute began between Ferguson and the investors over the 
racehorse “The Rock of Gibraltar” McManus and Magnier sought a way out of 
Manchester United. Glazer gave it to them, taking on a nearly 70% controlling stake in 
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the process. Protests erupted outside of Old Trafford as fans showed out against what 
they saw as a hostile takeover, and events spun so out of hand that riot police were used 
to break up the crowd violently.193 This was the first of several protests between 2006 and 
2010, but fortunately for public order it was the most disruptive of them. Glazer kept on 
club CEO David Gill as a show of good intent with other club officials, the board, and 
most importantly Sir Alex Ferguson, with whom David Gill had a very good working 
relationship. This infrastructure was important for the temporary future of the club, but 
was demonstrative of the minimal footballing knowledge the Glazers possessed, as well 
as their lack of connections within the game. When this infrastructure was removed, the 
Glazers would be left without reliable football minds to keep turning out results on the 
pitch.  
Even with Ferguson and Gill left in charge to continue their team-building and 
management, Manchester United’s fan base was intensely divided over the change in 
ownership. Protests against the Glazer takeover were immediate, and a section of 
Manchester United fans even broke away and formed a new, community owned and 
operated football club. FC United of Manchester was founded in 2005 by breakaway 
fans, with the club itself stating that the Glazer takeover of Manchester United was “a 
catalyst and final straw by some, but it was not the sole reason for the formation of FC 
United.”194 Supporters of the breakaway justified their decision by identifying the 
acceptance of the Glazers as a betrayal of the club’s values. “The club I have loved all my 
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life is no more,” one supporter wrote on a United fan site. “All the things we love - the 
chanting, the banter, the humour, the passion -have disappeared from Old Trafford.”195  
There was interest in the national media in gathering opinions as well, with the BBC 
asking fans to write in their take on the Glazer takeover. Many shared the sentiment of 
the breakaway fans, calling it a low point of the club’s history. “This really is the biggest 
downer in our club’s history,” wrote one blogger.196 The moment was a turning point for 
this section of supporters, signaling the end of their support of the club. The moment 
highlighted the intense connection fans felt with the club, and what they saw as a betrayal 
prompted these emotional responses.  
Other supporters were much less concerned about the takeover, regardless of the 
circumstances, and initially many fans were willing to accept what had happened. “Let's 
face facts! The majority of REAL fans realistically know that Glazer has got our beloved 
club in the bag,” one supporter wrote. “There's no point fighting a losing battle. Unless 
someone can throw in a few hundred million? So let's just look into the future.”197 The 
emphasis on “real” is in regard to the breakaway FC United fans, and represented a 
divide between those that took the situation as a serious and damaging turn for the club as 
opposed to the upset but loyal faction. This reflected an annoyed but accepting section of 
supporters that appeared to have been a majority given continued local support for the 
club. Most fans appeared to dislike the Glazers throughout their tenure, but there were 
still record setting attendance figures year in and year out, as well as profitable 
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merchandise and media revenues. The support for the club largely continued, and 
certainly survived the breakaway of FC United of Manchester fans. The protests that 
continued indicate the unrest never fully ended, but the inability to oust the Glazers 
through any sort of boycott of club performances, goods, or services is demonstrative of 
the loyalty that still existed within the Manchester United fanbase.  
Sociologist Adam Brown pointed out that the protests against the Glazers were 
not simply anti-American and anti-foreign investment, but rather a plea by the local 
community to not be cast aside in the operations of the football club that they and their 
ancestors had always supported. For the local fanbase they were not simply “customers,” 
and they detested the commercially focused, “globalizing policies” of the club.198 The 
longest serving members of the Manchester United community were desperate to 
maintain what they loved and cherished for so long, and did not mind sharing it with the 
world so long as it meant they remained important in its existence. They were after all 
Mancunian, and the club achieved its greatest ever period of sustained success under the 
previous ownership setup. The Glazer takeover was not necessary for the survival of the 
club, but for fans the agency of supporter ownership was a vital connection between the 
club and its local community.  
Fan ownership was not unusual in European football, but the operation of top 
clubs in the modern era indicated a necessity for wealthy bankrollers. As the revenue of 
top clubs increased so did operating costs, especially player expenses. Transfer fees paid 
for the buyout of players and wages increased dramatically from the 1990s to the 2010s, 
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and coincided with the increase in revenue. An article from Vox Media calculated 
Premier League transfer inflation between the 1997/98 and 2017/18 seasons, and found 
that even after just a few seasons many transfer fees would have quadrupled their worth 
because of how rapidly revenue and spending increased.199 Because of this clubs became 
more reliant on wealthy individuals and investment groups to bankroll team expenses. FC 
Barcelona remained one of the few major clubs in football that is entirely owned by 
supporters. Over 143,855 club members own FC Barcelona, and vote on club board 
members and a club President. Football journalist and historian Jonathan Wilson 
observed that the history at Barcelona was similar to that at Manchester United, one of 
immense success on the pitch built through the club’s youth academy in the 1990s and 
2000s.200 Becoming a powerful team in this period allowed teams to expand their brand 
as new multimedia allowed global access to the sport. However, a decline in form on the 
pitch after decades of success made Barcelona’s severe internal financial and political 
problems a more popular topic of discussion, and the club risked monumental breakdown 
if it could not properly manage a turnaround.201 This was a situation where having 
owners like the Glazers was actually somewhat useful for United. As was mentioned 
earlier, their goal of making a profit meant that while the club had absorbed massive debt 
from the Glazer’s use of loans in their takeover, the structure installed was designed for 
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economic sustainability and commercial growth. Manchester United avoided problems 
that Barcelona accrued because the club was not set up to take massive financial risk or 
loans for the sake of club expenditure. The club never neared such dangers pre-Glazer 
takeover, but the club did well following financial regulations of FIFA and UEFA while 
still turning a profit under the Glazers. 
The model of fan ownership continued to exist largely at smaller clubs in Britain, 
and  did manage to do so with relative success. Szymanski, author of the highly praised 
Soccernomics, presented in his book Money and Soccer a model for successful supporter 
trust ownership via Welsh club Swansea City.202 Though Northern Ireland and Scotland 
independently established their own football leagues, most Welsh clubs play within the 
English pyramid. Swansea City were the first Welsh club to gain promotion to the 
Premier League in 2011, and stayed afloat in the division until their relegation in 2018. 
Despite some serious issues with club management in the early 2000s, the club were able 
to turn things around, Szymanski argued, with the help of community input, recruitment 
of wealthy fans, intelligent footballing decisions by the board in selection of managers, 
and the completion of strong transfers within a limited budget.203 The problem that this 
presented of course was that staying in the Premier League only grew a club’s economic 
power so much, and in doing so also raised the value of player and manager contracts. 
Szymanski’s book was written before 2018, so it could not have accurately predicted 
Swansea City’s relegation from the Premier League, but it was foreseeable that the club’s 
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excellent recruits would move on because of the lure of bigger and richer clubs.204 
Manager Roberto Martinez left the club in 2008 because of the draw of managing 
Premier League club Wigan Athletic, and his replacement, Brendan Rodgers, left in 2012 
because of the draw of Liverpool, a club with which he would challenge for the Premier 
League title in 2014. Swansea won a League Cup in 2013, but declined soon afterward, 
and lost several key players along the way to richer clubs before they finally suffered the 
fate of relegation in 2018.  
Swansea established the means of achieving promotion within their own limits, 
led by a supporters ownership group, but the ceiling of their success was reached in doing 
so. This showed the limits of the modern game on smaller clubs, created by the wealth 
gap and expense of the Premier League. The new rules that money dictated in 
professional football held smaller clubs in economic limbo, and even though there were 
paths to the Premier League for clubs owned by a supporters’ trust, the market was hardly 
stable. The risk was greater than the reward for many clubs, and the result competitively 
was stagnation with suppressed mobility between the highest tiers of English league 
football.  
The control that larger clubs had over the market in English football was reflected 
to greater effect in other top European Leagues, with France and Germany each featuring 
a single, rarely challenged club as perennial champions of their respective domestic 
competitions. Spain and Italy typically featured a bit more competition, but were still 
largely controlled by Real Madrid and Barcelona, and Juventus and the two Milan clubs 
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respectively. Real Madrid and Barcelona were however owned by supporters' trust funds, 
members of which elected club officials to run the club. This did not mean the clubs 
lacked wealth or wealthy investors, and management in the modern era turned to more 
commercial, revenue-focused approaches that sustained the massive economies of each 
club. The connection to communities was tense in Europe, but in England there were 
several instances of direct conflict and disconnect between club management and club 
communities.  
Stadium relocation in the Premier League era was a particular source of conflict 
between communities and clubs for a number of reasons. Though it was a status symbol 
to build a new stadium it also angered fanbases over the destruction of historic grounds 
that intensified the fan atmosphere. Moves also had the potential to uproot local 
businesses, homes, spaces, etc., and in some cases it symbolized wastefulness for teams 
that already had beloved and sustainable football grounds. This was the case with 
Arsenal’s controversial move from Highbury to a new ground named “The Emirates,” 
funded by the Middle Eastern airline Fly Emirates, which also became the club’s shirt 
sponsor.205 The move was massively unpopular with fans, who bemoaned the lack of 
atmosphere with the introduction of more corporate seating.206 David Goldblatt wrote 
about such an issue within the context of the 2012 London Olympics, and highlighted the 
wastefulness that was often found in the structure of mega sporting events and calling for 
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meaningful effort by sporting bodies to allow repurposing of facilities.207 The London 
Stadium, built for the 2012 games was repurposed by West Ham United in London, 
giving the club nearly double the seating capacity that their historic ground at Upton Park 
gave them, and making them one of the biggest venues in the Premier League. This was 
the kind of work that Goldblatt was hoping to see beyond the 2012 games, and he 
expressed admiration for the social value in the local investment in clubs. He wrote: 
“Our sporting life points to the immense potential waiting to be tapped once we 
recognise the power of play to mobilise support and the capacity of clubs to be 
more than clubs. We must be bold enough to support new forms of common 
ownership and a real transfer of assets from state to society.”208  
He named the anti-Glazer protests as an example of inspiring activism in the wake of 
corporatization in the sport, and called for more involvement in society from these 
lightning rods of cultural and communal energy.209 Certainly in the Premier League era 
the relationship between clubs and social movements was tricky, despite the apparent 
desire of some clubs to tout their history as a working-man’s club.  
Goldblatt’s writing sympathized with fans, and his emphasis on the wastefulness 
of mega-event venues raised an issue that was dear to many fans, but the modern 
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stadiums were a far cry from the sort of football grounds that supporters valued. In the 
specific case of West Ham United, the ground they left held historic value in the 
community and fanbase. It had been West Ham’s home since 1904, and the ground 
enhanced the voices of some 35,000 fans each match, creating a raucous and hostile 
feeling for visiting sides. The Olympic Stadium on the other hand looked nice but was 
widely detested by the club’s supporters. Stephen Cross, a longtime member of the 
Hammers United supporters’ club wrote about grievances with the move for The 
Guardian. “We have no singing section and have lost our home advantage,” Cross writes. 
“The stadium is soulless and while supporters have made an effort to get behind the team, 
the atmosphere seems to be all but gone. The connection is fading.”210 Cross’ words are 
similar to the voices heard against stadium restructuring in the wake of the Hillsborough 
Disaster, arguing that clubs are missing the point when they attempt to address the fan 
experience.  
A historic protest in 2010 by Liverpool supporters shared many of the concerns 
raised in the anti-Glazer protests by Manchester United fans, and demonstrated a level of 
power from supporters’ groups that could still exist at a rich club without fans having 
direct influence over club management. American investors Tom Hicks and George 
Gillett had a short tenure as owners of Liverpool between 2007 and 2010, and were 
forced to sell their shares of the club to John W. Henry’s Fenway Sports Group, then 
known as New England Sports Ventures. Hicks and Gillett were forced out after 
struggling to repay the loan used to buy the club in 2007, and the undervalued rate at 
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which their shares were sold was barely enough just to cover their losses from the 
project.211 The pair had been nearly instantaneously detested by Liverpool supporters for 
their empty promises of investment after a leveraged buyout of club shares (similar to 
Malcolm Glazer’s takeover of Manchester United). They proposed an unpopular plan for 
a new stadium rather than renovating the club’s historic ground at Anfield, and used the 
club to absorb debt from loans taken out to purchase it in the first place. Sociologist Peter 
Millward analyzed the forced sale of the Hicks and Gillett shares after just three years of 
ownership, arguing that this showed the power of fan protest against some owners. Fan 
organizing mobilized in new ways, starting social media campaigns that encouraged 
direct local action as well as contributions and involvement from Liverpool fans across 
the world.212 The study is significant for its use of digital age methods in protest 
organization, demonstrating the impact of social movements on the internet within 
football communities. While an issue for Manchester United supporters appeared to be 
the feeling of abandonment among local fans, Liverpool fans showed the value in 
connecting global fanbases to local groups. It is interesting too that the new ownership 
group offered about the same style of ownership that Hicks and Gillett did. Henry and his 
investment group made it clear they had no intention of selling any ownership stake to 
the Liverpool Supporters’ Trust, but they did show an interest in listening to fans and 
setting up lines of official communication between supporters’ groups and the club’s 
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board of directors.213 The difference highlighted by Millward is these meetings was the 
effort to establish trust between new ownership and supporters’ trusts. Henry delivered 
on promises to renovate Anfield, and funded moves for star players that once again 
catapulted Liverpool to domestic and European success. However, the lack of supporter-
based ownership, even at a minority level, was a frustrating reality for many football 
communities that desired agency in the management of their clubs. For Manchester 
United there was not a drop in performances early in the Glazer ownership, but the lack 
of reinvestment in the squad at the same rate as years period became a significant issue 
for the fans and the team. Serious doubts would emerge from fans and players when key 
stars left the team without being replaced.  
Manchester United’s Footballing Decline and Commercial Expansion 
In the summer of 2006 manager Sir Alex Ferguson made the decision to move on 
from long serving captain Roy Keane and sell the club’s top goalscorer, Ruud Van 
Nistelrooy, to Real Madrid. Midfielder Michael Carrick was bought from Tottenham 
Hotspur to take his place, but this was the only move of the transfer window. This was 
surprising given the loss of such important players, but the key changes came from within 
the squad. Ferguson refitted his attack around the young duo of Wayne Rooney and 
Cristiano Ronaldo, players purchased before the arrival of the Glazers. The payoff was 
instant as the pair delivered on the manager's trust with a first Premier League title in four 
years.214 Carrick came good as well, along with the relatively cheap defensive 
acquisitions of goalkeeper Edwin Van Der Sar, Nemanja Vidic, and Patrice Evra from the 
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season before. They turned out to be bargain deals in the newly inflated transfer market, 
in which the Glazers were reluctant to spend, and the team became one of the most 
formidable defenses in Premier League history. They secured three successive Premier 
League titles, which temporarily silenced doubts that the team would struggle without 
continuing to spend, but the mood started to shift significantly when the owners failed to 
replace the best outgoing talent.   
 Wayne Rooney was an undisputed star, but Cristiano Ronaldo transcended the 
game in an unprecedented way. He scored 42 goals in the 2007/08 season, leading United 
to a Premier League and UEFA Champions League double.215 It was the club’s third ever 
Champions League win, and Ronaldo became the first United player since George Best in 
1968 to win the Ballon D’or, awarded to the best footballer in the world. Having won 
every possible trophy for the club, Ronaldo asked to leave for Spanish club Real Madrid 
in 2009. A transfer was agreed for £81 million, then a world record fee for a player, but 
putting a price tag on the best footballer in the world was always going to be a bitter task 
for fans of the selling club.216 Prolific striker Carlos Tevez left the club as well, and 
joined – of all teams – hated in-city rival Manchester City. What made the situation 
worse for the fans and the team was the money accumulated from player exits was not 
reinvested in the squad by the Glazers. Forward Michael Owen was signed on a free 
transfer from Newcastle United, and was free for good reason.217 The former England 
golden boy was once one of the best forwards in Europe, but joined United as an aging, 
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injury-prone player who was fast approaching the end of his career in 2009. Young 
French winger Gabriel Obertan was hyped as a potential Ronaldo replacement, but he 
hardly saw the pitch in his short time at Old Trafford. Antonio Valencia became a reliable 
squad player for nearly a decade, but hardly provided the impact that Ronaldo did. What 
exacerbated the gap in quality was Owen’s taking of the no. 7 shirt vacated by Ronaldo, 
an iconic number in the history of the club and typically worn by one of the best players 
in the squad. He never came close to replicating the production of Ronaldo or Tevez, and 
United lost the 2009/10 Premier League to rivals Chelsea.  
 The lack of marquee arrivals made the Glazer ownership much more unpopular 
amongst fans, and protests increased at Manchester United matches. Ugly chants about 
the owners could be heard fairly regularly at Old Trafford, and the press responded by 
acknowledging the conduct in a negative light. One Bleacher Report writer even wrote 
“Fans have to realize exactly who they are and must act that way. They are not the 
shareholders or owners, merely ticket holders.”218 The protests were far reaching with 
Green and Gold protests at matches and a supporters’ group called the “Red Knights” 
organizing fan investors to try and match the Glazers.219 The group ultimately failed to 
convince the Glazers to sell, but the number of fans that backed the plan was indicative of 
the sympathy that many had with anti-Glazer protests. Club legend David Beckham even 
sported a Green and Gold scarf thrown onto the pitch after playing for Milan against 
Manchester United at Old Trafford in a UEFA Champions League fixture in 2010, adding 
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high profile solidarity with the movement.220 Even club star Wayne Rooney became 
unsettled over the poor investment in team building. His key strike partners Ronaldo and 
Carlos Tevez leaving unreplaced in the summer of 2009 put the burden of playmaking 
and goalscoring on his shoulders, and he overplayed himself to a career threatening injury 
because of it. As a result of poor reinvestment, Rooney submitted a transfer request in the 
summer of 2010.221 Though he eventually signed a new contract after some convincing 
from Ferguson, Rooney’s public unhappiness contributed to the public discourse of the 
club management under the Glazers. The transfers in 2009 and 2010 were limited in 
terms of spending, as it became clearer that the Glazers were interested in turning 
Manchester United into a more profitable personal investment than maintaining the same 
level of competitiveness on the pitch with multiple expensive transfers.  
Despite the lack of investment in transfers by the Glazers the discourse in the 
press at the time indicated little worry of what was to come in terms of drop off. Sports 
writers significantly weighed the footballing success against concern for the future. One 
sports writer even framed the new, cost-effective approach as “financial stability,” citing 
the recent bankruptcies of the clubs Portsmouth and Plymouth Argyle respectively as 
means for concern in football economics.222 This comparison highlighted how historic 
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teams could buckle under the weight of expensive transfers and wages, but it is quite a 
stretch to argue that Manchester United would struggle in a way that was similar to 
minnow clubs such as Portsmouth and Plymouth Argyle. Despite the leeching tendencies 
of the Glazers, Manchester United’s infrastructure was designed to be profitable. Club 
Vice President Ed Woodward specialized in the marketability of the club before taking 
over as club executive, and in that time United’s annual revenue doubled.223 The club was 
incredibly profitable, much more so than before, but this did not translate to reinvestment 
on part of the Glazers. Edwards’s tenure was unpopular among fans, but throughout his 
lengthy sellout the club continued to reinvest.  
The stable approach also meant a rapid increase in ticket prices and an expansion 
of club sponsorships deals and corporate partnerships, both of which angered fans despite 
the increase of revenue. For one, the profitability directly affected the Glazers without 
adding talent to the team, and two, higher ticket prices and corporate sponsorships 
increased the paywall between supporters and the Old Trafford experience. Portions of 
the stadium were sold off as corporate seating for partner companies to award to 
employees and board members, which further drove up the price for supporters’ sections 
as there was a high demand for fewer tickets. The club had spent a lot of money 
expanding Old Trafford, and by the mid-2000s it was the biggest club venue in the 
country, holding a capacity of around 76,000.224  
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This was likely due to the frustration that came with the end of the Red Knights’ 
bid for a majority purchase of club shares. When the Glazers didn’t budge, even after 
intense protest, protests became fewer and far between. It helped matters too that the 
expertise of Ferguson and a team built around Wayne Rooney kept United competitive 
domestically and in Europe. They won Premier League titles in 2010/11 and 2012/13, 
only losing the 2009/10 and 2011/12 titles on the final day of the season, won the League 
Cup in 2010, and reached the UEFA Champions League final in 2011. A few high profile 
arrivals helped appease fans outraged by limited spending, as did the appearance of 
sustained progress that came with winning trophies, and the 2010 protests would be the 
last major protest for over a decade.225 Then Sir Alex Ferguson announced his retirement 
after securing the 2012/13 Premier League title, a decision that came with some surprise 
before the season had even ended.226 The mood around the club at the time was 
celebratory, with both championship ceremonies in full swing with a parade through the 
city of Manchester and the footballing world reminiscing about Ferguson's unprecedented 
career.227 What perhaps went under the radar because of this was Ferguson’s successor, 
David Moyes. Moyes had been managing mid-tier side Everton since the early 2000s, but 
had never won a trophy. His friendship with Ferguson was key in his appointment, but 
there was a plethora of much more decorated managers that were not considered, and no 
hiring process was conducted. The result was sobering for a club that had not struggled 
for trophies since the 1980s. Manchester United finished in seventh place under Moyes as 
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Manchester City clinched the Premier League title. It was their lowest league finish since 
before the foundation of the Premier League, and meant the club failed to qualify for 
European competition for the first time in over twenty years.228 So soon after Ferguson’s 
retirement it became clear that a club revival would not be a quick fix.  
The team lacked leadership at all levels of the club, and an identity crisis set in 
that to this day Manchester United have yet to solve. When Ferguson retired he took on a 
reduced role as a club ambassador and executive board member, though the board role 
was largely symbolic. Long-time Chief Executive David Gill also took a reduced role to 
serve as an executive for the English FA, meaning that the club’s internal structure for 
scouting, team building, management, and transfers was suddenly removed and replaced 
with a new chief executive, one Ed Woodward. He was a veteran in the world of finance 
who helped the Glazers take over the club in 2005 and served as Director of Commercial 
and Media operations until his promotion in 2013.229 This news went under the radar 
because of the club’s ongoing Premier League title race, but was equally significant to 
Ferguson’s retirement in terms of Manchester United’s downfall on the pitch.  
Though the club remained profitable for the Glazers, Woodward’s poor business 
in the transfer market saw United miss out on signings as well as overpay for players that 
didn’t quite pan out. In one of their worst deals they paid around £60 million for Angel 
Di Maria, only for him to leave after just one disappointing season for £40 million, a loss 
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of £20 million for United.230 They went through three managers in six seasons as well: 
the aforementioned Moyes, Louis Van Gaal, and Jose Mourinho. Both Van Gaal and 
Mourinho were highly regarded and accomplished managers in Europe’s top leagues and 
the UEFA Champions League, but failed similarly to Moyes. Each manager attempted to 
install his own footballing philosophy at a club that hadn’t undergone a culture change in 
nearly three decades, and the result was a hodgepodge team with no clear direction. It 
was at this time too that United’s rivals each appeared to emerge more powerful than 
before. Manchester City reclaimed the title in 2014, Arsenal won the FA Cup for the first 
time in nearly a decade, Chelsea won the title in 2015 and 2017, and Liverpool began 
their journey back to prominence, culminating in a UEFA Champions League triumph 
and a first league title since 1990. The shared Premier League wealth was finally 
benefitting other clubs in Ferguson’s absence, and Manchester United were left 
struggling with owners seeking a profit and a Chief Executive with no experience 
running a football team.  
The Multimedia Football Club 
Significantly, as the club declined as a football power it continued to grow 
commercially. Woodward continued his work as Director of Commercial and Media to 
greater effect as the club’s Chief Executive, and continued to expand the brand with new 
sponsorship and partnership deals around the world. Manchester United was not only a 
club that was abundantly aware of its brand and worth in the modern sport, it was a club 
that consciously contributed to the construction of its legacy and image. Manchester 
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United capitalized on its mass appeal and marketability to great commercial success in 
the modern footballing market through numerous sponsorship and partnership deals, and 
streamlined its history and identity into multimedia content. They even had players 
featured in comically bad movie promotionals for films such as X-Men and Deadpool.231 
The club helped sell everything from luxury watches and scotch whiskey to sports drinks 
and petrol.232 While it brought in a lot of cash it did not fund more successful teams.  
The massive sell out did not impact the club much on the pitch as they struggled 
to find successors to Sir Alex Ferguson or his championship winning teams, but it was 
important nonetheless in the maintenance of the club as it continues to search for familiar 
heights. The numerous ventures into media kept United’s name alive in culture, and in 
many respects nostalgia was marketed and sold as part of the club’s modern ventures. 
The fears of fans that Adam Brown observed in 2007 had come to fruition: The club 
became more a megastore for Manchester United nostalgia and commodities than a 
functional football team.233  
A primary area of the club’s expansion was into multimedia production. The club 
created a strong presence on social media promoting both its men’s and women’s teams, 
celebrating major holidays of multiple cultures and religions, and sharing clips and 
highlights from matches in various formats. The club even made a TikTok social media 
account, formatting highlights to fit TikTok styles and trends and getting players to 
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perform for the camera.234 The club’s marketing team is acutely aware of modern trends 
and platforms globally, and has accounts based worldwide in multiple languages as part 
of its outreach to fans and younger audiences. 
Among the club's productions also includes feature length documentaries and 
season reviews dating back to the early 1990s. The club even has its own TV 
broadcasting channel, MUTV, which was founded in 1998 and continues to provide 
exclusive content and coverage for subscribers. One Manchester United writer and 
podcaster described it as “a North Korean propaganda channel for Manchester United,” 
indicating a serious lack of objectivity when it came to coverage of the club.235 There was 
even a tape that was allegedly destroyed from a segment where then Manchester United 
captain Roy Keane was deemed to be too critical of his teammates on a post-match 
show.236 Punditsalso neglected to aim criticism at the club’s board, chairman, or owners 
when it came to extended periods of poor form whereas the consensus in other areas of 
media coverage focuses on Chief Executive Ed Woodward’s poor judgement in football 
matters. This furthered claims by fans who saw much of the defense of the club to be 
ignorant of the Glazer ownership’s role, and accused former players of avoiding the 
talking point. In some ways multimedia served as a form of distraction as well, and 
offered a medium to glorify the club and its past as it struggled in the present.  
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The climate of the club had permanently changed, and nostalgia became a remedy 
in the form of media and film. The documentary Class of 92 was released during the 
2013/14 season, a low point for the club post-Ferguson. The film told the story of the 
famed academy graduates of 1992 and the 1999 Treble winning team. It featured 
interviews from the players, Sir Alex Ferguson, youth coach Eric Harrison, Eric Cantona, 
Prime Minister Tony Blair, and Stone Roses bassist Mani among others.237 It was a 
collection of personalities that fueled a 1990s nostalgic feature and placed Manchester 
United’s values of youth and never say die attitude front and center. The film did not 
hesitate in emphasizing Manchester United’s importance both in English football and the 
larger cultural context of Cool Britannia and Britpop. The players of the Class of 92 were 
iconic in their own right with all five of Nicky Butt, Ryan Giggs, Gary Neville, Phil 
Neville, and Paul Scholes becoming club legends. The sixth of them, David Beckham, 
was a transcendent star who achieved an unprecedented level of celebrity as a footballer. 
Quite simply, Beckham was an English pop star. His elite talent on the pitch paired with 
good looks, an eye for fashion and modeling, and a marriage to pop music icon Victoria 
Beckham, AKA Posh Spice of the Spice Girls, all made him more than just another great 
English player. Class of 92 acknowledged this in its placement of the history within the 
Cool Britannia and Britpop movements.  
In connecting the club narrative to Britain as a whole, Class of 92 tied the club’s 
values of bringing youth into the first team to the youthfulness of British culture and 
politics in the 1990s. Former Prime Minister and Labour Party Leader Tony Blair, an 
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interviewee in the documentary, regards Manchester United’s dominance in the 1990s 
and the Treble especially as a special moment in British culture, and in particular another 
signifier of the next generation coming of age.238 As leader of what was called New 
Labour, Blair wedded the party to significantly more capitalistic values than was 
previously the case. His landslide victory in the 1997 General election came with a strong 
embrace of the latest cultural phenomena and a rallying of notable celebrity support in 
football, music, and film. Blair even suggested the fact that he was young at the time to 
be significant in his becoming such a prominent political leader after seventeen years of 
Conservative rule.239  
Another notable interviewee is Mancunian born film director Danny Boyle, who 
grew up a Manchester United fan. His perspective furthers the cultural connection the 
club is embracing, and he offers an almost literary take on the romanticism of the Busby 
Babes and Class of 92 comparison that is clearly pushed throughout the film.240 Boyle 
rose to prominence in the 1990s because of his hit film Trainspotting in 1996, and his 
vision clearly embraces the people and places of a downtrodden and decaying post-
industrial British landscape. His presence is another link the club is making to the culture 
of both the city of Manchester and Britain as a whole. Manchester in the 1980s and 1990s 
was a cultural hub, particularly in music. Madchester and Britpop acts such as New 
Order, The Smiths, and Oasis became international successes by producing innovative 
alternative music that many believed captured an image of the city itself. The image of a 
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working-class city was embraced by Ferguson as well, who in his interview emphasized 
his use of anecdotes from his time living and working in Glasgow, and reminded players 
constantly of the working men and women they played for every weekend.241 The idea of 
representing something greater than themselves was wholeheartedly embraced in the 
film, and is a significant example of the importance of history and nostalgia to the 
Manchester United identity. 
The films discussed in this chapter indicated a strong self-awareness by 
Manchester United and its key personalities of the role that it’s history and perceived 
value of promoting homegrown talent play in the growth and maintenance of its fanbase. 
Even the act of an investment in educating an audience on the club’s own history through 
such platforms shows the value that the club has in its image as one of the biggest 
franchises in any sport on the planet. They also embrace the never say die image that was 
perpetuated by the many late comebacks that took place throughout Ferguson’s tenure. 
Conscious of their history, the club embraced links from the present to the past, and no 
story was more important in club legend than the 1958 Munich Air Disaster and 
subsequent rebuilding under legendary manager Sir Matt Busby.  
 The legendary Manchester United team of the 1950s was the first English team to 
compete in the European Cup, winning multiple League titles with a young core of 
Academy products known as the “Busby Babes.”242 They competed in Europe against the 
wishes of the Football League, and thus saw little leeway in terms of scheduling 
accommodation. Short turnarounds after midweek games were more difficult to manage 
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at that time, and long flights across the continent were sometimes required. The team’s 
plane stopped to refuel in Munich, Germany after a 3-3 European Cup quarter-final 
second leg draw in Yugoslavia against Red Star Belgrade in 1958. Harsh winter 
conditions made takeoff difficult, and the pilots had to abandon it twice. A third attempt 
took the aircraft past the point of no return, and the plane skidded off the runway across a 
road and crashed into a house. Twenty-three people were killed in the crash, including 
eight Manchester United players and three club staff members.243 Busby spent several 
weeks recovering in the hospital, and was in such poor condition that survivors delayed 
telling him the extent of casualties out of fear of worsening his condition. Busby carried 
survivors’ guilt with him for the rest of his life, but decided to return to management the 
next season after his recovery. With much of his squad lost, he again turned to youth to 
rebuild. Five years after Munich he had built a team ready to compete again, winning the 
FA Cup in 1963 before winning the league once again in 1965 and 1967. In 1968 
Manchester United finally won the European Cup, captained by Sir Bobby Charlton, one 
of the youngest members of the 1958 team and a survivor of Munich.  
 The club commemorated the victims with a memorial outside of Old Trafford, as 
well as statues of Sir Matt Busby and the “United Trinity” of Charlton, Denis Law, and 
George Best. The tragedy has shown up in popular culture as well. Sing magazine editor 
Eric Winter wrote a song titled “The Flowers of Manchester, and Morrissey, solo artist 
and former singer for Manchester band The Smiths, wrote a song titled “Munich Air 
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Disaster” honoring the victims and survivors.244 245 There was even a BBC feature film 
made about the Munich Air Disaster in 2011 starring David Tennant as Assistant 
Manager Jimmy Murphy.246 The cultural investment in maintaining the memory of 
Munich is unquestionable, and such an important moment in the club’s history 
immortalized time and again in popular culture signified the role the club possessed in 
England as a whole. Rising from the ashes of a crashed plane, Busby and surviving 
players built again and won the elusive European Cup. And for a club that has made a 
reputation for comeback wins, the 1968 European Cup is perhaps its most important fight 
back.  
Manchester United also produced a number of season review films, which 
organized its accomplishments and uniquely documented them in film format rather than 
in annual book form starting in the 1990s. They released a season review DVD every 
year, charting the previous year’s campaign, highlights, and storylines. In the season 
reviews, the club constructs a season as a narrative, showing highlights of every game 
while adding brief interruptions to expand the context. While this adds to the production, 
it ultimately has also allowed the club to leave out or gloss over some damaging and/or 
controversial storylines that were affecting the season in real time. In the 2002/03 season 
review film a couple of controversies by club captain Roy Keane were glanced over 
quickly despite their causing a significant headache for the player and club during the 
season. In the summer of 2002 Keane abruptly abandoned the Ireland national team at the 
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2002 FIFA World Cup in Japan over arguments with the team’s manager about the 
quality of training and housing facilities for the Irish camp. This sort of behavior was 
unheard of at a World Cup from any player, let alone a national team captain like Roy 
Keane. The incident also came after the publication of Keane’s autobiography, in which 
he admitted to intentionally fouling Manchester City player Alf-Inge Haaland as 
retribution for the latter ending Keane’s season with a harsh tackle a couple years prior. 
The tackle was bad enough that the FA initially suspended Keane for three matches and 
fined £5,000, but upon his stating that the tackle was premeditated he was fined a further 
£150,000 and suspended for an additional five matches. The film however only addressed 
these incidents briefly, saying “Roy Keane was at the center of controversy over his 
decision to leave the World Cup, and the materialization of that book.”247 The incident 
was obviously much larger than this narration let on, and going into the new season there 
was discourse in the press about whether Keane’s behavior should continue to be 
accepted. The Guardian was keen to point out that Keane had quite the history of bad 
tackles and aggression, and the BBC argued that he was let off lightly in regards to his 
punishment.248 249  
This sort of focus on a singular incident could be seen as overinvolvement of the 
press but is one of many examples of football narrative being left behind in history and 
memory. Keane was at the center of attention for some time before undergoing a knee 
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operation that kept him sidelined until the spring of that season, and upon his return 
avoided the same sort of focus in the press that he was subject to as Manchester United 
once again won the Premier League. Keane was one of the inaugural inductees into the 
Premier League Hall of Fame in 2021, securing his legacy as one of the all time greats.250 
But for all the grace and brilliance of his game, there was an ugly side that was a part of 
his legend that shouldn’t be forgotten.    
A notable exclusion from the 2018/19 season review is the story of mistreatment 
directed at Paul Pogba by the club’s own manager.251 Pogba, a World Cup winner with 
France and Manchester United’s record transfer signing, was subject to intense and often 
unwarranted criticism in the media throughout his time at the club. This was exacerbated 
during runs of bad form because of his tumultuous relationship with manager, Jose 
Mourinho, who called him a “virus” in front of the rest of the squad ahead of a match 
against Southampton.252 Many fans bought into the manager’s side of things, blaming 
Paul Pogba for the team’s poor form. In truth, Pogba had a career year that season, and 
was even named in the Premier League team of the season.253 The rough relationship 
between Mourinho and Pogba was a major part of that season for United, and emblematic 
of the disconnect between the manager and the squad in a way that eventually cost the 
former his job. What was given the spotlight and focus of the season review was the 
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appointment of Ole Gunnar Solskjaer as the club’s interim, and eventually permanent 
manager.254 The man who scored one of the most significant goals in the club’s long 
history took the big job, and notably was the first manager post-Sir Alex Ferguson to 
have any pre-existing relationship with the club. This status, and his honoring of the 
club’s history and playing values under Ferguson made him stand out amongst the 
successors, and fit an identity that the club had peddled throughout their miserable efforts 
to be a winning club once again.  
Manchester United’s production on the pitch reached a new low under Jose 
Mourinho. At the time of his firing they sat nineteen points behind league leaders and 
were out of a qualification spot for European competition. The high profile clashes 
between the manager and squad plagued the team to that point, and the club’s board 
responded to the toxicity by sacking him mid-season.255 When the hero of the 1999 
Champions League final took the temporary job there was a feeling that it would only be 
temporary. Solskjaer arrived during the offseason of his job managing Norwegian club 
Molde. It was a job he had taken in 2012 after managing Manchester United’s youth 
team, and had been there since with a brief spell in charge of Cardiff City in an ill-fated 
relegation battle during the 2013/14 season. With this as his resume it seemed unlikely 
that he would be given the job on a permanent basis, and then Tottenham manager was 
the press’ favorite to take over at the end of the campaign.256 Solskjaer was an under the 
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radar choice for caretaker manager, but he was more than familiar with the club’s rich 
culture and history, and brought infectious and immediate positivity to the team.257 The 
club went on an unbeaten run into February, racked up wins over Chelsea and Arsenal in 
the FA Cup, and staged a dramatic comeback win against Paris Saint-Germain in the 
UEFA Champions League.258 The momentum was unsustainable, as injuries and over the 
last month of the season ended hopes of a cup win and Champions League qualification, 
but the performances were enough for the board to give Solskjaer the job on a permanent 
basis.  
The hire of Ole Gunnar Solskjaer as manager felt like a similar move to the club’s 
nostalgia-fueled marketing. An iconic figure of their past returning to save them from 
austerity sounded too good to be true, and to a degree the club was embracing an image 
of itself that appealed to fans. And for an event that happened in the 2018/19 season there 
was already a book written by the end of 2020 documenting Solskjaer’s tenure to that 
point. But the fact that the Solskjaer experiment had some success in just a short time in 
charge was an obvious boost to the project, but Solskjaer’s tactics and investment in 
certain players reflect a consciousness of the club’s history and values as well. Solskjaer 
gave great trust to players from the United academy, notably forwards Marcus Rashford 
and Mason Greenwood, and midfielder Scott McTominay. The fans, and even the players 
themselves, embraced comparisons to self-identified club heroes whom they watched 
growing up. The presence of nostalgia within the current team fit the bill for Manchester 
United’s modern branding, but it worked better than what they tried before.  
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 This thesis has examined power dynamics in professional sport, and how they 
changed over time because of revenue focused management and the introduction of 
foreign investment in the English game. Manchester United’s history as a successful 
power in England and Europe made them an attractive sporting commodity, and the club 
took every opportunity commercially to capitalize on their success. Through those efforts 
in the Premier League era they achieved their status as one of the most supported teams 
in any sport across the world. It did, however, anger its local supporter base, and in some 
cases caused irreparable damage to its relationship with fans. And yet, the connection 
other fans feel with the club continued to transcend their distaste for ownership, and they 
bought into the recent turn towards club management that reflected tradition and history. 
The climate of the modern club brought a new level of toxicity for fans to cope with, but 
the ones who endured did so because something remained that kept the club close to what 
they always loved. In this way Manchester United was a success as well, masterfully 
making itself accessible through multiple forms of media and placing commercial value 
in documenting its achievements.  
David Goldblatt argued that football as a whole had already transformed into a 
nostalgia-machine, harkening images and atmosphere that glorify an industrial culture 
that Britain has long since abandoned. The appeal of football in the age of 
commercialism has been able to capture and market a connection to tradition and history, 
evolving into a “golden age of benign communality” so soon after being seen as a 
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pathogen in the body of society.259 The romance in Goldblatt’s writing hides some of the 
ugliness that remained in English football, but taps in beautifully to the broad appeal that 
the game maintained. Manchester United and the Premier League were attractive to so 
many for a reason, they offered a connection deeper than just the surface level of elite 
sporting entertainment. Football maintained popularity because of the communal 
connection it offered, and elevating it to a global level meant that those communities 
expanded.  
Ole Gunnar Solskjaer’s appointment as Manchester United manager was justified 
given the change in mood and form at the club, but it also served to give life back to 
supporters who had become further frustrated with the club’s modern disconnect from its 
past. After a significant loss to Spanish underdogs Sevilla in the Champions a league in 
2018 Jose Mourinho claimed it was the result of “football heritage,” meaning that the 
club’s recent failure to consistently reach the Champions League had something to do 
with their inability to compete in Europe rather than Mourinho’s own conservative tactics 
being to blame.260 It was a negative and soul sucking excuse from the manager, who just 
the previous season had just won a European competition with United. Solskjaer was the 
opposite. He radiated positivity as well as nostalgia, and notably quipped “that’s Man 
United” after beating PSG in the Champions League a year on from the “football 
heritage” rant.261 The quotes could not be more different and are fitting to signify the 
difference between what Manchester United fans did not and did want to hear. Though 
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the club tried often to find what fans wanted to hear, in Solskjaer perhaps they hit the nail 
on the head as they set out to repair a relationship with fans that needed mending for over 






CHAPTER V – CONCLUSION 
When the Premier League was formed in 1992 it was done at the behest of 
wealthy club owners who held a shared interest in maximizing revenue at their clubs. The 
product was successful without compromising the foundations of the English game based 
on merit and fairness. The promotion/relegation system remained, and any team can 
dream of one day making the steep climb to the top of the pyramid. However, the primary 
beneficiaries of the Premier League were indeed the clubs that have never had to imagine 
life in a relegation battle. Many of the original club owners who founded the Premier 
League have since sold their respective clubs for massive profits, and outside investment 
in the top teams has widened the wealth gap between the top clubs and the rest of the 
clubs in the country. The Premier League era saw an increase of dialogue and activism in 
regard to racism and hooliganism, both of which plagued the English game in years prior, 
but the primary motivation for doing so was to protect the footballing product. The 
culture of clubs changed as well, and as wealthy owners and investment groups became 
the norm, football communities lost meaningful stakes in their clubs. Only clubs with 
massive financial backing remained truly competitive, and it was a case of the rich 
getting richer.  
Only twice had a club outside of the “Big Six” won the Premier League, but rare 
as it may be at least there is the chance that it could happen even in the age of big money. 
In 2015/16 Leicester City did just that, beating England’s best to the Premier League title 
against 5000/1 odds. The team’s best players N’golo Kante and Riyad Mahrez would go 
on to sign with Chelsea and Manchester City respectively, but the blueprint was there for 
smaller clubs to build smartly and apply analytics to their recruitment to find diamonds in 
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the rough and build a special squad to challenge the best. Still, it was highly unlikely that 
such an underdog victory would happen against the game’s big spenders again.  
 On April 18, 2021, twelve of the biggest clubs in Europe announced their 
agreement to join a European Super League, an elite competition that features only the 
twelve best clubs each season, with potential to add other legacy clubs in the future. The 
Big Six English clubs made up half of this twelve, and the proposal immediately angered 
much of the footballing world. Fanbases for each of the clubs immediately condemned 
the move, labeling it as a greedy and morally bankrupt decision by billionaire owners to 
create an elitist tournament based on wealth and status instead of merit. The spirit of 
competition was considered by many to be totally compromised by this Super League, 
and fans, governing bodies in the sport, and even actual governments from around the 
world began searching for ways to prevent it from happening altogether. After just 48 
hours the weight of protests and opposition convinced the six English clubs to quit the 
project, and three of the other European clubs soon followed. Opposition was 
interestingly more tempered in Spain and Italy, and for a common reason: jealousy of 
Premier League money. The English Premier League’s ever-expanding economic power 
left other European leagues worse off and envious, and there has only been so much 
UEFA and FIFA could do to maintain financial fairness. The money that the Super 
League would bring in for the richest clubs would complete the wealth gap between them 
and the haves and the haves not in European football. 
 Much of this thesis was written before the European Super League’s life and 
death, but its examination of the Premier League’s foundation, the financial motivations 
for doing so, and the long-term effects since lead well into the inception and attempted 
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realization of an elite, private league for Europe’s wealthiest clubs. The Super League 
proved that this topic is a fairly recent one which continues to unfold in new ways, but 
what remains true throughout modern developments is the expanding wealth gap between 
the top of the English football pyramid and the rest of the game. Inequality within the 
game expanded the ability of clubs like Manchester United to succeed while clubs like 
Leeds United and Swansea City struggled to stay alive. The Super League history cannot 
be written yet, but it is doubtless symptomatic of the same issues that surfaced in the 
sport after the Premier League was founded. Football became not only significantly more 
dependent on money, but it also became controlled by people who were completely 
driven by money. The founders of the Premier League were the same, and they all cashed 
out for massive profit. The Super League founders tried in their own way to do the same.   
Supporters were successful in their stance against the Super League despite their 
clear loss of agency in the game, but it took the backing of everyone else in the sport who 
was missing out on a slice of the pie to create a level of pressure on the owners of the 
twelve rebel clubs to convince them to back out. FIFA and UEFA both threatened 
sanctions, and the Premier League, Spain’s La Liga, and Italy’s Serie A threatened points 
reductions. However, institutional backing of fans might not have been the same had 
FIFA and UEFA been a part of the Super League plans, and readers should look no 
further than recent allegations of corruption and bribery within both governing bodies to 
understand that their moral high ground was very weak in that situation. 
Manchester United’s involvement in the Super League was significant as well. 
They were a club whose former owner was instrumental in forming the Premier League, 
and the efforts of the Glazers in forming a Super League confirmed the fears of 
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Manchester United fans about their involvement. “Glazer Out” protests resumed en 
masse outside of Old Trafford, and a massive demonstration ahead of a Premier League 
match against Liverpool led to a match postponement. Thousands of fans gathered in 
protest of the Glazers, and a group of them even broke into Old Trafford and invaded the 
pitch. This took place even after the club’s withdrawal from the Super League, the 
resignation of club executive Ed Woodward, and a rare direct communication of apology 
from Joel Glazer to the fans. The protests did not force a sale of the club, but 
unprecedented dialogue took place between ownership and fans, with plans of an 
influential supporters’ ownership stake and significant investment by the Glazers into the 
team and its facilities discussed. United fans may not have gotten the Glazers out, but 
their continued protest prompted a significant response 
Chapter two’s exploration of ways in which the Premier League addressed racism 
is similarly linked with ongoing issues. The diversification of the Premier League forced 
the hands of clubs and the FA to begin following the government’s lead in banning hate 
groups and abusive supporters from football grounds. Through activism and policy, 
racism was largely pushed out of football spaces and into more online settings, which 
seems to be the likely continued direction for combating racism in football. Though some 
academic discourse has taken place in this subject in race studies and sociology it is an 
arena that will likely need to develop more before more proper historical analysis can 
occur. The increase in online racism over the 2010s was well documented, but methods 
of reacting to and removing it are still not well established. The summer of 2020 was a 
particularly interesting period of online racism being discussed publicly by players and 
managers, as well as leagues and clubs lobbying social media companies to enact harsher 
 
136 
punishments for abusive accounts. Some even called for relaxed privacy protections so 
that accounts could be traced to the person operating them. This coincided with an 
international revival of the Black Lives Matter movement in response to police killing of 
black people and a cultural reevaluation of monuments to people and events of Europe 
and the United States’ white supremacist past. It is also a period of the Premier League 
that will no doubt be remembered for the adaptation of play for the Covid-19 global 
pandemic, but the social isolation appeared to have enhanced player activism on social 
issues as well as virtual hostility from spectators.  
This thesis took a broad approach to the history of the English Premier League 
and commercialization, and hopefully serves as a platform for future study on the topic. 
Difficulties presented by researching during the Covid-19 global pandemic brought 
unwelcome challenges to the project, and for future study on the subject I would like to 
conduct research on documents that would be accessible in person, as well as oral history 
interviews with fanzine editors, supporter activists, and even players if possible, to 
expand upon the cultural history sections. This is the part of the historiography this thesis 
strived to expand and is the area that most compels me in my efforts to explore the 
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